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The Function of Article V
(forthcoming in 163 University of Pennsylvania Law Review – (2014))
Aziz Z. Huq*
Abstract
What good is Article V? The Constitution’s amendment rule renders the text
inflexible, countermajoritarian, and insensitive to important contemporary
constituencies. Comparative empirical studies, moreover, show that textual
rigidity is not only rare in other countries’ organic documents but highly
correlated with constitutional failure. To promote our Constitution’s survival and
to counteract Article V’s ‘dead hand’ effect, commentators argue, Americans
have turned to informal amendment through the courts or ‘super’ statutes. Article
V, the conventional wisdom goes, is a dead letter. Against this pervasive
skepticism, I propose that Article V instead played an important but hitherto
unrecognized function in the early Republic. Article V mitigated a ‘hold up’
dilemma that could have precluded ratification and undermined the new
Constitution’s stability. By hindering strategic deployment of textual amendment,
Article V-induced rigidity fostered a virtuous circle of investment in new
institutions such as political parties and financial infrastructure. Recognition of
Article V’s role in the early Republic leads to a more nuanced view of the
Constitution’s amendatory regime. In effect, we have a two-speed Constitution—
with Article V-induced rigidity at the inception supplemented gradually over time
by informal judicial or statutory amendment protocols.
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Introduction
What good is Article V? The amendment rule crafted in 1787 renders the Constitution
one of “the most inflexible” ever written.1 Commentators calumnify Article V for making the
constitutional text obdurately unresponsive to changing public sentiment.2 Other scholars depict
the handful of amendments that do pass its gauntlet as excessively nationalist in orientation.3
Worse, empirical studies of constitutions across the globe find that textual rigidity is highly
correlated with early constitutional demise. In that light, our Constitution’s “longevity … defies
expectations.”4 As a result, Article V has become “the constitutional provision … to hate.”5
Scholarly cottage industries have emerged to explain not only how Americans over time have
seized upon alternative avenues for constitutional change, such as the Supreme Court,6
framework statutes,7 and populist “constitutional moments.”8 In effect, scholars have given up on
1

ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 101 (2009)
[hereinafter Elkins et al., ENDURANCE]; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 49 (2011) (describing the amendment process as “intractable”);
Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643, 645–46 (2011) [hereinafter Dixon,
Partial Constitutional Amendments] (“Article V imposes some of the most onerous hurdles in the world for the
ratification of amendments.”); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 355, 362 (1994) (same).
2
See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 319, 321 [hereinafter Dixon,
Updating Constitutional Rules ] (“[C]hanges in social circumstances and understandings over time mean that, from a
contemporary perspective, a number of core constitutional rules are now no longer optimal.”); Stephen N. Griffen,
The Nominee Is … Article V, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 51–53 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson, eds., 1998).
3
See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National Convention
Amendment Method and How to Fix Them, 96 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1513 (2010) (“[T]he constitutional amendment
method has allowed Congress to promote amendments that accord with its own preferences ….”).
4
ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 65; Id. at 123 (noting that the United States “do[es] not seem to fit” the
predictions of comparative analyses of constitutional survival).
5
John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. REV., 1929, 1954 (2003); see
also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappoport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1727
(2010) (“Article V is almost universally criticized as being too stringent rather than too permissive.”). For a
particularly sharp version of the critique, see Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is … Article V, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 171, 173 (1995).
6
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 905–15 (1996) [hereinafter
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation] (arguing for the priority of judicial doctrine over constitutional
text). The same article makes the point that “legislators and even ordinary citizens, in their encounters with the
Constitution, act in ways [consistent with a process of incremental constitutional change].” Id. at 925; accord
Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 9, at 1505 (“The people rule not through discrete, climactic, political acts like
formal constitutional amendments, but in a different way—often simply through the way they run their nonpolitical
lives, sometimes combined with sustained political activity spread over a generation or more.”).
7
See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, at 6–9; id. at 12–13 (“America enjoys a constitution of statutes
supplementing its written Constitution as to the most fundamental features of government.”); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1218 (2001) (introducing concept).
8
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 3–31 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS] (offering up a theory of “higher lawmaking” to explain extra-textual amendments during
Reconstruction and the New Deal); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 459 (1994) (arguing that “Congress would be obliged to call a
convention to propose revisions [to the Constitution] if a majority of American voters so petition; and that an
amendment or new constitution could be lawfully ratified by a simple majority of the American electorate”); see
also Bruce Ackerman, We the People Rise Again, SLATE, June 4, 2012, available at http://hive.slate.com/hive/how-
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Article V in favor of these substitute modalities of constitutional change. The conventional
wisdom is, accordingly, that “our system would look the same today if Article V of the
Constitution had never been adopted and the Constitution contained no provision for formal
amendment.”9
This Article questions the consensus view of Article V’s irrelevance. Rather than always
being superfluous, I argue, Article V-induced rigidity played an important, if unacknowledged,
role in promoting the Constitution’s survival at a key moment in American history—the early
decades of the Republic. In the antebellum period, textual rigidity mitigated a problem of
strategic “hold up” by key interest groups. Strategic invocation of the amendment power, I
suggest, could have precluded the Constitution’s ratification, handicapped the development of
essential national institutions such as financial infrastructure and political parties, and even
precipitated secession. By hindering the strategic use of textual amendments, Article V-induced
rigidity fostered a virtuous circle of investments in new subconstitutional institutions—I offer
political parties and financial infrastructure as specific examples. At the same time, it deferred
conflict on highly divisive questions, unresolved in the Constitution’s text, until the Union could
better withstand the shock of their resolution. Without Article V, therefore, there might be
eulogies rather than encomia today for the 1787 Constitution.
By contrast, informal amendments of the sort lauded today provide no solution to the
early Republic’s hold-up problem. In the first decades of the new Republic, after all, neither the
Court nor Congress played the expansive role that judges and legislators do today in crafting
workarounds and constraints to non-functioning constitutional rules (even if they were
extraordinarily creative when it came to developing functional subconstitutional institutions to
give life to the document’s larger aspirations). To redound to non-Article V mechanisms of
constitutional amendment to explain the Constitution’s early survival is therefore anachronistic.
Instead, recognition of Article V’s stabilizing function in the early Republic should lead to a
more nuanced view of the Constitution’s amendment regime. In effect, we have a ‘two-speed’
Constitution: On the one hand, Article V-induced rigidity during the early Republic enabled the
development of national institutions necessary to anchor the new nation. And on the other hand,
those very institutions over time created flexibility-generating judicial or statutory amendment
alternatives in ways that facilitated adaption to changing times and shifting democratic
preferences. Both formal rigidity and informal flexibility, that is, have contributed to
constitutional survival—but have done so at different times.
That a constitution survives, of course, is no guarantee that its institutional contents or
substantive direction are optimal in social welfare terms or desirable on normative grounds.
Indeed, it is important to note at the outset that my analysis on this Article is oriented toward
explaining the brute fact of the Constitution’s survival. I do not intend to offer a normative or
welfarist claim either to the effect that any specific feature of the federal Constitution is
desirable, or that its continued survival in its observed form to the contemporary period is
can-we-fix-constitution/article/we-the-people-rise-again. A variant on this argument relies on legislative action. See
Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, supra note 2, at 336–40 (arguing that courts should look sympathetically on
legislative efforts to update constitutional rules).
9
David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2001)
[hereinafter Strauss, Irrelevance].
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desirable. Most obviously, the Constitution as originally drafted fell far short of democratic and
equality ideals by allowing for a limited franchise and accomodating the peculiar institution of
slavery. Similarly, my argument is orthogonal to the oft-made contemporary plaint that radical
constitutional reform is desirable, say, on democratic grounds.10
The central task of the Article is to identify and describe the causal mechanism linking
textual rigidity to constitutional survival in the early Republic. To develop that account, I draw
on law-and-economics literature about the design of long-term, relational contracts. Many such
contracts are necessarily “vague or silent on a number of key issues”—much like a
constitution.11 The literature identifies strategic breach and opportunistic renegotiation as central
impediments to successful contracting. Recently, scholars have suggested that a written
contract’s internal resistance to change (e.g., through a no-modification clause) can promote
efficient, after-the-fact investments by parties and can thereby increase the likelihood of the
contract’s survival.12
Mutatis mutandi, the same dynamic unfolds in the constitutional context. A constitution’s
text embodies a deal between powerful national-level interest groups, each of whom can each
threaten to exit (e.g., by secession) from the deal.13 The drafters, like parties to a private deal, are
unable to detail fully in the text how all conceivable disputes should be resolved.14 Hence,
constitutions are inevitably incomplete.15 Once ratified, a necessarily incomplete constitution
will succeed only if interest groups invest in supplemental national institutions, such as political
and financial infrastructure, to anchor the new nation. Inevitably, such investments must be
tailored to a given constitution’s particulars. But this very specificity creates a serious problem.16
Parties who make such investments lock themselves in to this particular constitution. They thus
make themselves vulnerable to “hold-ups” by other parties, who can try to expropriate a greater
share of national wealth through renegotiation of the original deal by textual amendments. A
strategic hold-up might involve either changing a rule that is in the text already, or addressing a
question left unresolved by the original text. Either way, proponents of a strategic amendment
hope to exploit the fact that other parties with post-ratification investments will cede some
surplus—and hence accept a disfavored amendment—rather than risk constitutional failure and
10

For a cogent argument along these lines, see SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
11
Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, 67 ECONOMETRICA 741, 741 (1999).
12

See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J.
LEG. STUD. 203, 205 (1997) (“Contrary to traditional wisdom, the parties to a contract may be better off if the law
enables them to tie their hands, or ties their hands for them, in a way that prevents them from taking advantage of
certain ex post profitable modification opportunities.”). I rely on Jolls not for the specific mechanisms she
identifies—respecting moral hazard and preference change over time—but on her general insight into the value of
contractual rigidity.
13
See, e.g., Daniel Sutter, Enforcing Constitutional Constraints, 8 CONST. POL. ECON. 139 (1997) (analyzing
constitutions as incomplete contracts); accord Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Incomplete Social Contracts, 1 J.
EURO. ECON. ASS’N 38, 38–41 (2003).
14
Tirole, supra note 11, at 741–42 (noting the pervasiveness of contractual incompleteness in political life).
15
The phrase “incomplete contract” can refer either to (1) obligational incompleteness, where a term (such as price
or quantity in the ordinary contracting context) is not included, and (2) insufficient state contingency, because of a
failure to fully realize the potential gains from trade in all future states of the world. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992). In this
Article, I mean the phrase “incomplete contracting” to refer to insufficient state contingency.
16
ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 71.
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wholesale loss of their constitution-specific investments.17 The shadow of strategic amendment
threats will undermine a constitution’s chances of getting off the ground. Post-ratification, it can
also engender inefficient underinvestment and conflict.
Textual rigidity directly mitigates these problems by limiting parties’ ability to engage in
strategic post-ratification hold-ups.18 To borrow from Albert Hirschman’s famous vocabulary of
exit, voice, and loyalty, rigidity limits opportunities for voice (i.e., amendment) as a way of
maintaining loyalty (i.e., investment in new national institutions).19 At the same time, rigidity
indirectly reduces the likelihood of outright exit through secession. It further facilitates
“cooperative investment” in new subconstitutional institutions such as political parties and
banks. Such investments not only enable the realization of welfare gains immanent in the new
constitutional order,20 but also anchor parties into the constitutional deal by raising the cost of
exit.21 In effect, Article V encourages all parties to have ‘skin in the game.’ A positive feedback
mechanism thereby arises, as investment induces confidence, which in turn yields more
investment; the prospect of exit recedes from sight. The odd fact that the Constitution is
famously silent about secession is then explained by the fact that Article V itself raises the costs
of secession, hence making it unattractive.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the conventional view of Article V,
emphasizing the puzzle of our Constitution’s surprising longevity. The heart of the Article is Part
II, which identifies and describes a causal link between textual inflexibility and constitutional
survival. I also furnish here evidence of the mechanism’s operation during the early Republic.
Part III then identifies and responds to potential objections, elaborates some consequences of the
foregoing analysis, and then concludes by pointing toward how the analysis supports a “twospeed” account of the Constitution.
I.

Article V in Constitutional Theory

The idea of a “hold-up” in contract law is broader than the sense in which I am using the term. See 1A A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 171, at 105 (1963) (using the term to refer to a situation in which a party to a contract,
through economic duress, forces the other party to agree to a contract modification); see also Steven Shavell,
Contractual Hold-up and Legal Intervention, 36 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 326–27 (2007) (discussing a range of hold-up
problems).
18
This assumes that the constitution is substantively justified. Of course, there may be a “severe conflict between
constitutionality and justice.” MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 13
(2006).
19
To be clear, my argument is distinct from Hirschman’s. His book is in large measure a critique of the perverse
effects of relying on exit rights, and a description of alternative dynamics, such as one in which “loyalty holds exit at
bay and activates voice.” ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 78 (1970). The analogies between constitutional commitment and amendment in my
argument and loyalty and voice in Hirschman’s are suggestive, but hardly exact parallels.
20
For a development of the concept of a cooperative investment, see Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch,
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 125, 126 (1999) (defining a cooperative
investment as one that “generate[s] a direct benefit for a trading partner”).
21
The basic intuition here echoes Ernest Young’s observation that there is “a set of political institutions” that do
“most of our constitutive work [i.e., establishing the various instruments through which governance happens] to …
outside the Constitution itself.” Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 456
(2007).
17
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This Part first describes how Article V works and explores the critiques offered by both
comparative constitutional scholars and normative theorists. I also explore why informal
mechanisms of constitutional amendments via judicial decisions or super-statutes cannot explain
the fact that our Constitution’s longevity “defies expectations.”22
A.

The Mechanics of Article V
Article V of the 1787 Constitution provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that
no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred
and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.23

Article V thus creates what is basically a two-stage proposal. The first stage (proposal) is done
either by supermajorities in Congress or among the several states’ legislatures. The second
(ratification) requires larger supermajorities of the states acting in either legislatures or
conventions.24 In practice, only Congress proposes amendments, and with one exception, only
state legislatures do the ratifying.25 The de facto threshold for constitutional amendment,
therefore, is two-third supermajorities in Congress plus successful votes in 75 state houses
(assuming one is Nebraska’s unicameral chamber).26

ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 65 (“There may be good reasons to adopt the Philadelphia model …
but constitutional endurance is not one of them.”).
23
U.S. CONST. ART. V.
24
The states are permitted to determine their own thresholds for ratification. See Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291,
1306 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (Stevens, J.).
25
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103
YALE L.J. 677, 734 (1993) (noting that no national convention has ever been called); Michael B. Rappaport, The
Constitutionality of a Limited Convention: An Originalist Analysis, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 53, 60 (2012); see also
RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION
126 (1988) (describing the use of state conventions for the Twenty-First Amendment). One consequence is that
uncertainty lingers about how conventions might work. Compare William W. Van Alystne, Does Article V Restrict
the States to Calling Unlimited Conventions Only?—A Letter to a Colleague, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1305
(concluding that limited conventions are constitutional), with Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A
Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 198 (1972) (taking the opposite view).
26
One reason for the dominance of the congressional proposal route is its lower transaction costs. Lutz, supra note
1, at 361–62.
22
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The Framers included multiple mechanisms in Article V in response to cross-cutting
pressures in the Philadelphia Convention.27 Different factions amongst the delegates distrusted
either the proposed federal government or the several states.28 Delegates also divided “between
the contending republican faiths of the era, often characterized as Whig versus Federalist.”29
Whereas Whigs believed “people shared a capacity and a willingness to identify and support the
best interests of the community,” Federalists “assumed that people’s interests varied and that
government served as an arbiter between them.”30 To allay fears on all sides, the Convention
settled on a “compromise” mechanism that allowed either the federal government or state
institutions to be bypassed entirely.31 Whether Convention members expected that the
combination of veto gates and voting rules contained in Article V to be especially onerous,
though, is unclear. On the one hand, the delegates were keenly aware of their own fallibility. On
June 11, Virginia delegate George Mason warned them that the “plan now to be formed will
certainly be defective,” and so “[a]mendments therefore will be necessary and it will be better to
provide then, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence.”32
On the other hand, recorded votes belie Mason’s concerns. On September 10, for example, the
Convention voted to reject a ratification requirement of two-thirds of the states and instead
unanimously endorsed a three-quarters voting rule for ratification.33
In the ensuing ratification debates, partisans for the Constitution nevertheless
characterized its amendment rule as an optimum. Article V, wrote Madison in the Federalist 43,
27

See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT & AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995, at 55–60
(1996) (describing debates on amendment procedures at the Philadelphia Convention). The Constitution does not
provide a voting rule for use by a ratifying state legislature.
28
On June 11, 1787, George Mason expressed concern that Congress would abuse a power over constitutional
amendments. 4 THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 577 (Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987) (quoting
Mason as saying: “As the proposing of amendments is … to depend … ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of
the proper kind would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should become oppressive, as he verily
believed would be the case”). Alexander Hamilton, by contrast, warned that “[t]he State Legislatures will not apply
for alternations but with a view to increase their own power.” id.; see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 557–58 (Max Farrand, ed. 1966) [hereinafter 2 FARRAND] (noting Elbridge Gerry’s
concern that “two-third of the States may obtain a Convention, a majority of which can bind the Union to
innovations that may subvert the State-Constitutions altogether”); see also KYVIG, supra note 27, at 57
(summarizing debate between Gerry and Hamilton).
29
KYVIG, supra note 27, at 61.
30
Id. at 61–62.
31
Id. at 60 (“Article V evinced the essential compromise struck between the proponents of a strong central
government and the advocates of retained state power.”).
32
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 202–03 (Max Farrand, ed. 1966); see also AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 286 (2005) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION]
(describing a concern among the delegates that “an overly stiff amendment mechanism in a governing document
ultimately doomed the document to irrelevance by inviting outright repudiation”). On the other hand, Philip
Hamburger has argued that “[i]n 1776, it was assumed that a constitution had to be permanent, in the sense of being
lasting and even rigid, subject only to alteration by the people.” Philip Hamburger, The Constitution and Social
Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 263 (1989). On this view, only “perfecting” amendments were envisaged by the
Framers. Id. at 301. Other historians dispute this view. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 613 (1969) (“The American government never pretended … to perfection or to the
exclusion of future improvements.”). Whoever has the better of the historical argument, the “perfecting” only
understanding of Article V seems squarely at odds with constitutional practice as it developed.
33
2 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 555. The vote on the motion for a two-third voting rule was held first, and was
defeated five-six. Id.
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was “stamped with every mark of propriety” and “guards equally against the extreme facility that
would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate
its discovered faults.”34 The Madisonian position lingers in some quarters, where Article V is
still glossed as “a compromise between two competing policies … a sensible mechanism for
change.”35 The new constitution’s amendment rule also received little attention even in the state
conventions.36 Only in the Virginia Convention did Patrick Henry’s bleak claim that “the way to
amendment is, in my conception, shut” stimulate some debate about amendment protocols.37
Article V, then, was a compromise between fundamentally divergent accounts of
government and human nature. It passed into final, binding organic law attended by relatively
little scrutiny.38 Its puzzles would ripen only in the fullness of time.
B.

The Puzzle of Article V

Neither Madison nor Patrick Henry possessed the empirical resources to establish
whether Article V was, in fact, anomalously rigid or excessively yielding. Only in the last two
decades have political scientists and legal scholars developed a stock of comparative knowledge
about how constitutions work that permits the benchmarking of Article V against other
constitutional amendment rules.39 This section sketches the basic findings of that empirical
research to show that Article V is, as Patrick Henry complained, unusually rigid. More
importantly, I emphasize that the document’s survival in light of this rigidity is a puzzle given
the positive correlation between textual inflexibility and constitutional death—a puzzle that
cannot be dissolved by recourse to extra-textual modalities of amendment.

34

THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 284 (Madison) (I. Kramnick, ed. 1987). But, on the other hand, in the final Federalist
paper, Alexander Hamilton did emphasize the ease of amending pursuant to Article V, and contrasted it to the
difficulty of “establishing in the first instance, a complete Constitution.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 485
(Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 184–85 (Hamilton) (explaining that because the “circumstances
that endanger the safety of nations are infinite,” then “no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed” on national
security powers, and thereby suggesting another exogenous motor of constitutional change); THE FEDERALIST NO.
37, at 243 (J. Madison) (arguing that the Constitution “provide[d] a convenient mode of rectifying … errors, as
future experience may unfold them”).
35
Henry Paul Monaghan, We the Peoples, Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 121, 144 (1996); see also Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374 (1921) (“All amendments must have the sanction
of the people of the United States, the original fountain of power . . . and ratification by these assemblies in
threefourths
of the States shall be taken as a decisive expression of the people’s will and be binding on all.”). Kyvig also insists
that “in reality the amending process carried out the Founders’ intentions.” KYVIG, supra note 27, at 475. This is an
especially surprising claim given that Kyvig himself lucidly documents the plural, inconsistent and indeed mutually
contradictory “intentions” of the various members of the Philadelphia Convention.
36
According to Pauline Maier’s recent comprehensive study, Article V was either praised (in Massachusetts) or not
a subject of comment (in New Hampshire, North Carolina, and New York). PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE
PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION 191, 220, 371 & 419 (2010).
37
KYVIG, supra note 27, at 78–79.
38
Cf. Melissa Schwartzberg, The arbitrariness of supermajority rules, 49 SOC. SCI. INFO. 61, 72 (2010) (identifying
a “lack of reason supporting the supermajoritarian amendment threshold” at the Philadelphia Convention).
39
Indeed, some argue that this study is still in its infancy. David S. Law, Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 376, 384 (P. Cane & H.M. Kritzer, eds. 2010) (“[W]e know little about the
conditions under which [constitutional text] succeeds in the sense of either defining practice or improving social
welfare.”).
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1.

Textual Rigidity and Constitutional Endurance

From the first major comparative study of why constitutions survive, it has been clear
that Article V is an outlier. In 1994, political scientist Donald Lutz published a path-marking
study using data sets covering 50 American states and 32 nations’ constitutions.40 Comparing
amendment processes on a single numerical scale, Lutz found that “the United States has the
second-most-difficult amendment process” after the former Yugoslavia.41 The same study also
analyzed the correlation between the choice of amendment rule and constitutional survival.42 It
identified a curvilinear relationship between amendment rates and durability, with constitutions
tending to survive longest if amended at “moderate” rates.43 Reanalysis of the same data,
however, suggested that the relationship between amendment rate and durability was “very
weak” and “one can have extremely little confidence in the estimated optimal rate of
amendment.”44 Lutz’s finding might also be explained by a missing variable in his regressions.
For example, a country exposed to external military or fiscal shocks may as a result both amend
its constitution frequently and also repeatedly skirt constitutional death.45
More recent empirical work has addressed these criticisms. The most comprehensive
effort along these lines is a study based on data about 935 constitutional systems operating
between 1789 and 2006.46 This study finds “strong evidence” that “formally rigid constitutions
die more frequently” than flexible ones.47 To identify predictors of constitutional endurance, the
study’s authors—Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton—construct a multivariate event-history model.
Their model enables calculation of a baseline estimate of constitutional mortality. It then allows
for estimates of the effect of diverse endogenous design and exogenous economic and political
factors to be calculated.48 To address collinearity problems, the study defines “amendment ease”
by regressing amendment rate “on a set of amendment procedure variables and as well as on a
host of factors that should predict political reforms.”49 The Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton study is
presently the gold standard in empirical comparative constitutional analysis.
40

Lutz, supra note 1, at 355.
Id. at 362.
42
Id. at 360, 362 (Tables 2 & 5). Both tables divide the sample into eight subsamples based on the rate of a
constitution’s formal amendment, and then shows the average duration of a constitution in that subsample.
43
Id. at 360, 362.
44
John Ferejohn, The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of Constitutions, 22 L. & SOC. INQ. 501, 522 (1997);
see also Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective, 96, 105 (2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1833634 (noting that “for many existing studies [including,
presumably Lutz’s] the number of independent observations is sufficiently small that there is not enough statistical
power to pick up the distinct effect of various hurdles to amendment”).
45
In addition, any effect of an amendment rule on constitutional survival may be confounded by other constitutional
design decisions. TORSTEN PERSSON & GUIDO TABELLINI, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONS 105–12
(2005) (presenting cross-national data on the effects of these design variables). A further problem is that powerful
elites may respond to changes in formal institutions by establishing informal regimes that “fully offset” changes in
de jure power. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions, 98 AM. ECON.
REV. 267, 287 (2008) (noting that such offsetting is “broadly consistent with a number of historical examples”).
46
ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 48–51 (describing methodology whereby dataset was constructed). A
Constitution is defined as a text that is self-identified in its text as a higher law, or that is defined “the basic pattern
of authority by establishing or suspending an executive or legislative branch of government.” Id.
47
Id. at 82.
48
Id. at 129–39 (describing model in detail).
49
Id. at 101.
41
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Consistent with Lutz’s study, Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton find that the U.S.
Constitution “is scored as one of the most inflexible” ever drafted, scoring a 0.04 on a scale from
0 to 1.0.50 They further conclude that amendment ease is a “strong predictor of longevity”,
although its effect is curvilinear, with the very easiest-to-amend documents being especially
fragile.51 In addition to textual flexibility, Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton conclude that “inclusive
provisions,” greater textual scope (i.e., more subject-matter coverage), and greater specificity
promote a constitution’s survival.52
To explain these results, Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton offer a general causal model for
the life and death of constitutions. They argue that the creation of post-ratification enforcement
mechanisms is “key” to constitutional survival.53 That is, they emphasize how constitutional
designers must focus on providing sufficient ‘sticks’ for enforcers in the basic document to
ensure parties do not shade or defect after ratification. To be sure, Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton
also briefly touch on the possibility that ‘carrots’ may matter when they talk of ‘locking in’ a
constitution by “establish[ing] increasing streams of political benefits [that] may be better able to
withstand external pressures.”54 But this is not their main focus. And as Part II aims to show, it is
possible that constitutional survival derives from a mechanism that turns less on the prospect of
punishing defectors and more on the entanglement of contracting parties in positively productive
relationships.
All three of the factors their empirical analysis highlights as correlates of constitutional
survival, Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton explain, make enforcement of constitutional rules easier
by increasing the number of stick-wielders. That is, inclusivity draws into the constitutional
bargain a larger number of potential enforcers, whose diverse interests are then reflected in an
increasingly specific text. Similarly, flexibility is desirable because the ease of amendment
“induces smaller groups to mobilize for constitutional amendment” by giving them a greater
“stake in the survival of the document,” which can be amended to expand the bargain and
account for emergent interests and problems.55 In contrast, a terse, inflexible, and under-inclusive
constitution is likely to sap the incentives for potential enforcers to organize and act for the
collective good.56
This model yields puzzlement when applied to the U.S. context—as Ginsburg, Elkins,
and Melton candidly say. “Specificity, inclusion, and flexibility,” they note, are not virtues
50

Id.
ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 140.
52
Id. at 139, 141.
53
Id. at 76 (A “key factor in calculus of … breach is the ability of other parties to the bargain to enforce the terms of
the agreement.”).
54
Id. at 91.
55
Id. at 88–89.
56
Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton describe the initial Constitution as having “low” initial levels of inclusion. Id. at
163. There is persistent debate on how to gauge the representativeness of the Constitution’s drafting. Compare
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 18, 64–68 (arguing that ratification involved “the widest
imaginable participation rules” at least “in the eighteenth century,” and also underscoring the democratic pedigree of
Article I’s franchise rule), with WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 181
(2007) (noting that “the Framers were, demographically speaking, unrepresentative in the extreme” and “felt the
need to conceal their intentions” because of this unrepresentativeness).
51
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possessed by the 1787 Constitution.57 To the contrary, our Constitution’s longevity “defies
explanation” on this theory because it “embodies many of the elements that … should lead to
increased mortality rates.”58 This puzzle, it should also be noted, resists easy dissolution by
ascribing American national success solely to economic and demographic factors. The analysis
performed by Ginsburg et al. controls for a host of such non-legal factors and still finds text to be
a significant influence on constitutional survival. Their work, in order words, is strong counsel
against the simple expedient of disregarding textual specifications of epiphenomal formalisms.
To the contrary, the fixed verbal content of constitutional law seems to matter, even if it is not
exhaustive of all potential causes of regime survival. Assuming that one takes the U.S.
Constitution as having survived until now59—as both they and I do—there is a puzzle in how to
reconcile textual rigidity and constitutional survival in the American context.
2.

The Informal Amendment Solution

But is there a simple solution to this puzzle? To explain the survival of the U.S.
Constitution, Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton contend that Article V has been supplemented with
“informal flexibility…through informal [judicial] interpretation and various bisectional
compromises.”60 They build here on other scholars’ proposals that formal “constitutional
amendments have not been an important means of changing the constitutional order” in light of
alternative, informal means.61 Commentators have thus elaborated Court-centered accounts,
which point out that once congressional or executive power swells, it is the judiciary that steps in
to legitimate the change.62 These accounts point to decisions such as McCulloch v. Maryland63
and Crowell v. Benson64 as instances in which the Supreme Court has de facto ratified
constitutional transformation.65 Alternatively, Congress-centered accounts of constitutional
change identify framework “super-statutes” as key vectors of constitutional change those that
“transform Constitutional baselines,” “create entrenched governance structures and norms,” and
guide the development of norms otherwise only ambiguously articulated in the textual
constitution.66 Alternatively, constitutional change can be identified as a series of
“transformative moments” at which politically mobilized popular movements change the “higher
law” without changing the constitutional text.67 Given these informal alternatives to Article V,
57

ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 166.
Id. at 65.
59
One might alternatively argue that the Constitution failed in 1861, and that the post-Civil-War dispensation is
fundamentally a new one. This view is sufficiently unusual today I do not address it in this Article.
60
Id. at 177; id. at 163 (“Judicial review (as well as the evolution of popular understandings) has provided a
mechanism for updating the Constitution, thus ensuring that its allegedly timeless principles are applied to modern
realities ….”).
61
Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 9, at 1459; cf. Sanford Levinson, Political Implications of the Amending Clauses,
13 Const. Comm. 107, 109 (1996) [hereinafter Levinson, Political Implications] (“[I]t is naïve to identify
‘amendment’ only as formal textual additions (or subtractions).”).
62
Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 9, at 1467–73.
63
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
64
285 U.S. 22 (1932).
65
Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 9, at 1473 (invoking both McCulloch and Crowell to make this point).
66
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, at 6–9; id. at 12–13 (“America enjoys a constitution of statutes
supplementing its written Constitution as to the most fundamental features of government.”).
67
Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1056-57 (1984). For
an application of this theory to the Reconstruction, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 142–50
(1991). Critiques of Ackerman’s theory have refined the account of the specific mechanisms involved in
58
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the mystery of our Constitution’s rigidity might seem to explain. Simply put, it is easy to amend
the Constitution—just not through Article V.
But the puzzle is not so easily dissolved. Alternative mechanisms that rely on legislative
or judicial action68 cannot explain constitutional survival, particularly in the early Republic, for
three reasons. First, neither judicial benedictions nor landmark statutes can entirely pick up the
slack left by Article V-induced rigidity in a way that explains the Constitution’s survival because
neither is a full substitute for Article V on its own terms. Judicial and legislative mechanisms are
channels for adding to, not subtracting from, the constitutional fabric. Neither Congress nor the
courts can easily eliminate undesirable constitutional text.69 Imagine, to use a non-U.S. example,
an emergency powers provision that destabilizes governments by vesting presidents with power
to declare unilaterally suspensions of legislative rule.70 Neither legislative nor judicial action can
do much to resolve the ensuing hazards.71 The limits on informal amendment thus at least hint
that something more is needed to explain the Constitution’s survival.
Second, legislative and judicial mechanisms for constitutional change outside Article V
interact with and hinder enforcement via the specificity-based mechanisms identified by
Ginsburg, Elkins and Melton. Amending outside Article V increases the cost of specificity-based
constitutional enforcement because it increases uncertainty about what is in the constitution and
thereby makes it more costly to identify and police violations. Under a regime wherein informal
“transformative.” See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1045, 1068 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of “[p]artisan entrenchment through presidential appointments
to the judiciary”); James E. Fleming, We the Unconventional American People, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1537–39
(1998) (emphasizing the importance of creative acts of judicial review). But see David R. Dow, When Words Mean
What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 40 (1990) (“[T]he bottom line is that if the
Constitution is to continue to be the ultimate source that protects individual rights against encroachment by
government power and political majorities, then the affirmative words in Article V must be understood to negative
other conceivable modes of amendment.”).
68
For the purposes of this discussion, I treat Ackerman’s theory of controversial moments as a form of constitutional
change that occurs through legislatures and courts. The populist and political elements of his accounts are
orthogonal to my point here.
69
See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 160 (2006) [hereinafter LEVINSON, OUR
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION] (“Clever adaptive interpretation is not always possible, however, and Article V has
made it next to impossible to achieve such adaption where amendment is thought to be a necessity”). This is not to
say it is impossible to eliminate constitutional text through legislative or judicial action. An example may be the
treatment of the Republican Form of Government Clause of Article IV. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849) (finding arguments under that clause nonjusticiable). It might also be argued that the Court once read certain
rights clauses so narrowly as to sap them of any real meaning. Until District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008), some might have said as much about the Second Amendment. But it would seem more difficult for the Court
to achieve the same elimination effect respecting much-criticized structural provisions, such as apportionment rules
for the House and Senate or the Electoral College mechanism. See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION,
supra note 10, 49–62, 81–97 (developing further criticisms). Congress, however, might be able in some instance to
develop workarounds. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2000).
70
A well-known example is Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. RENÉ BRUNET, THE NEW GERMAN
CONSTITUTION 308 (Joseph Gollomb trans., 1922).
71
Could an undesirable provision be remedied simply by being ignored? Although there are provisions of the U.S.
Constitution that have fallen into desuetude, it is worth noting the role that courts have played in stymieing their
development. See, e.g., Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (treating Guaranty Clause of
Art. IV as raising only political questions); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (narrow construction of the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). In practice, it thus seems that desuetude is enabled
by judicial intervention.
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amendment is allowed, violators of an original deal can cloth transgressions in the terminology
of extra-textual amendment. They can thus seek to obscure self-dealing conduct. Moreover,
historical experience suggests that doubt will often arise as to whether a non-Article V
constitutional amendment has even worked.72 This conduces to even more uncertainty about the
constitution’s content. Finally, the potential for extra-textual amendment undermines potential
enforcers’ incentive to labor for changes to be memorialized in constitutional text. In all these
ways, the availability of extra-textual amendment works at cross-purposes to the enforcement
mechanism envisaged by Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton. This suggests that informal amendment
mechanisms have complex and partially offsetting effects—undermining some causes of
constitutional enforcement while contributing to a regime’s durability in other ways.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the key legislative and judicial contributions to
constitutional development come too late to explain the survival of the 1787 Constitution. As
Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton persuasively demonstrate, a constitution is at gravest risk of
demise in the very first two decades of its existence.73 And yet the leading account of our
“republic of statutes” focuses on such enactments as the Sherman Act of 1890, Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Social Security of 1935. 74 With their exception
of the Sherman Act, these key statutory props of the American constitutional order are twentiethcentury creations.75 The temporal distribution of judicial review is also such that it must be
rejected as an adequate substitute for Article V at the instant of greatest need.76 Judicial review
of state or federal statutes was rare prior to the Civil War.77 This should not surprise: The federal
judiciary developed institutional capacity to hear the volume of cases necessary to play a leading
role in constitutional development only after the Civil War.78 Consistent with this view, analyses
72

Keith Whittington, From Democratic Dualism to Political Realism: Transforming the Constitution, 10 CONST.
POL. ECON. 405, 411 (1999) (developing this point in reference to Ackerman’s account of dualist democracy).
73
ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 120 (noting that constitutions have a “median survival time” of
nineteen years and that their risk of death peaks at age seventeen).
74
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 1, 6–24 (providing a general overview of their argument, and mentioning
these enactments).
75
Another possible exception concerns what Eskridge and Ferejohn call the “monetary constitution.” Id. at 311. But
their argument is that “an independent central bank presiding over a national paper currency,” which they view as
the central and defining element of the monetary constitution, “emerged as a superstatuory framework regime only
in fits and starts.” Id. at 313. Only with the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 did the framework finally distill. Id. at 333–
39. Thus, even the monetary constitutions fit the temporal pattern they imply in other domains.
76
Indeed, the leading argument in favor of “the claim about the irrelevance of the amendment process” is explicitly
offered “in the context of a mature democratic society, not a fledgling constitutional order.” Strauss, Irrelevance,
supra note 9, at 1460. The mechanism I develop below concerns “how [the constitution] becomes established in the
first place” and not “how a constitutional system changes.” Id. My argument has a distinct domain from Professor
Strauss’s.
77
See Aziz Z. Huq, When was Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 CAL. L. REV. 579 (2012) [hereinafter Huq, Judicial SelfRestraint]; see also Mark A. Graber, The New Fiction: Dred Scott and the Language of Judicial Authority, 82
CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 177, 180–81 (2007) (counting twenty pre-Civil War cases in which the Court imposed
constitutional limits on congressional power but finding no “judicial tradition, activist or restrained . . . at the time
when Dred Scott was decided”). In recent years, revisionist accounts of judicial review have sought to identify a
more robust role for the Court in the early republic. But even self-consciously revisionist accounts marshal only
weak evidence of judicial activity on constitutional matters in that period. Tom S. Clark & Keith E. Whittington,
Ideology, Partisanship, and Judicial Review of Acts of Congress, 1789-2006, at 11 available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1475660 (graphing trends in judicial review).
78
See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties can use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the
United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. PO. SCI. REV. 511, 512 (2002) (arguing that the “understaffed and unpaid”
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of antebellum judicial review furnish scant reason to believe courts were an effective substitute
for Article V change. There are two instances in which the Court invalidated federal statutes
before the Civil War. In the first instance, the Court struck down an insignificant fragment of the
1789 Judiciary Act based upon a dubious statutory interpretation.79 That same year, the Court
ducked confrontation with Congress by allowing the legislature to disestablish existing federal
courts—starkly illustrating the court’s powerlessness in the teeth of political opposition.80
Almost sixty years later, the Court once again invalidated a federal law, and this time garnered
vigorous criticism while failing to check a march to civil war and a concomitant repudiation of
the Court’s legal reasoning.81 Given this track record, it simply cannot be said that federal courts
or Congress effectively bore the responsibility of ratifying and enabling fundamental change in
the early Republic as arguably they do today.
One response to this would be to insist on the constitutional creativity of early
generations of American politicians. Indeed, it is indupitably true that early legislators viewed
the Constitution as a central lodestar for their work, as the late David Currie demonstrated in his
magisterial and extensive history of the Constitution in Congress.82 Moreover, there was no
wholesale absence of “unconventional adaptation” and “political innovation” through the
political crises of the early Republic.83 Nevertheless, the most important constitutional crisis of
the early Republic did produce a (surpassingly rare) constitutional change in the form of the
Twelve Amendment, rather than some extra-textual shift.84 Further, Currie’s history suggests that
fidelity to the Constitution limited, rather than expanded, the options from which conscientious
legislators could choose. Path-dependent institutional legacies from the ensuing decisions should
thus not be mistaken for conscious efforts at constitutional transformation.85 Indeed, I will argue
in Part II that much of this institutional back-and-fill should be understood as subconstitutional
institutional development that was enabled by textual rigidity, rather than constitutional
transformation that formally demanded a constitutional amendment.86
Only one proposed model of informal constitutional change addresses events during the
early Republic. It focuses on legislated compromises between Northern and Southern states
beginning with the 1820 Missouri Compromise and ending with the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act,
which each promoted “sectional balance” by maintaining the equilibrium between slave and free

judicial infrastructure headed by justices perennially distracted by the travails of riding circuit of 1800 had “become
by century's end a real third branch of government”).
79
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
80
See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
81
That case, of course, is Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 363 (1857).
82
See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997).
For a specific example of important legislation in the early Congress with constitutional overtones, see the
discussion of removal power questions in Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10 &
n.33 (2013) [hereinafter “Huq. Removal”].
83
Joanne Freeman, The Election of 1800: A Study in Political Change, 108 YALE L.J. 1959, 1968-69 (1999).
84
Id. at 1989.
85
Ongoing work by my colleague Alison LaCroix on the use of federal spending in the early Republic attests to the
perceived binding force of the written constitution, and the perceived need for Article V-mediated change to the text
before the deployment of measures universally viewed as desirable.
86
It is important to concede though, that the line between constitutional change and subconstitutional institutional
development is a contestable one, and I do not claim otherwise.
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states in the Senate.87 Sectional balance legislation, however, was not perceived at the time as
amending the Constitution. Rather, it was understood as liquidating a principle immanent “from
the beginning … in the projection of an equal number of new free and slave states in the
territories in the 1780s.”88 Such legislation evinced loyalty to the original deal. The use of
sectional balance legislation, therefore, is not evidence of successful amendment, but instead
evidence that the rigidity and stability of the original constitutional deal played a role in
promoting constitutional survival.
In sum, informal amendment protocols, whether they rely on judicial decisions,
framework statutes, or constitutional moments, can provide only a partial explanation of the
Constitution’s longevity. In particular, they do a poor job of explaining constitutional survival in
the parlous antebellum period.
C.

The Normative Critique of Article V

The positive puzzle of Article V invites a suite of normative objections to Article V. If
the latter provision is unusually rigid, then the range of possible amendments will be functionally
cabined to only “perfecting” measures89 that are relatively inconsequential.90 As a result, many
commentators condemn Article V as “comatose”91 and functionally “irrelevant.”92 Two lines of
criticism follow. The first focuses on Article V’s countermajoritarian effect. The second
condemns Article V’s distributive consequences.
Consider first the countermajoritarian critique. Many commentators claim that, “from
both a historical and comparative perspective … Article V makes even the proposal of
amendments by Congress too difficult.”93 Inflexibility imposes the “dead hand”94 of past
87

See Barry Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC
POLICY: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE 343, 357–58 (Roger D. Congelton & Birgitta Swedenborg, eds., 2006)
[hereinafter Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability] (arguing that “an additional institution … called sectional
balance” was needed to provide “a static security for southerns and their property in slaves” (emphasis omitted));
ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 83 (adopting sectional balance argument). Weingast’s claim appears to
be that these laws in effect changed the Constitution by adding a new element to the deal.
88
Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, supra note 87, at 357.
89
Hamburger, supra note 32, at 301.
90
See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1741 (2007) (“A funny thing happened
to Americans on the way to the twenty-first century. We have lost our ability to write down our new constitutional
commitments in the old-fashioned way.”)
91
Robert G. Dixon, Article V: The Comatose Article of Our Living Constitution?, 66 MICH. L. REV. 931, 931 (1968).
92
Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 9, at 1459; accord Id? R.G. Dixon, supra note 91, at 932 (arguing that Article V
has become “little more than a constitutional toy for occasional distract and amusement”).
93
Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments, supra note 1, at 655 accord LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 165 (“Article V constitutes an iron cage with regard to changing some of the most
important aspects of our constitutional system.”); Griffin, supra note 5, at 173; see also Stephen Holmes,
Precommitment and the paradox of democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 195 (J. Elster & R.
Stagstad, eds. 1988) [hereinafter Holmes, Precommitment] (“Why should a constitutional framework, ratified two
centuries ago, have such enormous power over our lives today?”).
94
See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 609
(2008) (“Th[e] dead hand complaint can be broken into three claims: that it is feasible for the living to depart from
arrangements indicated by the Constitution; that our generation participated in little of the process responsible for
the text; and that the Constitution is otherwise imperfect for our time.”); accord McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note
5, at 1730.
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generations on current preferences.95 The countermajoritarian critique focuses on Article V’s
supermajoritarian character.96 By demanding extraordinarily large coalitions at both the proposal
and the ratification stage, Article V endows current minorities with disproportionate power to
block efforts by supermajoritian coalitions of more than seventy percent of the nation to fix
perceived constitutional problems. A blocking minority, moreover, may reflect the interests and
beliefs of a bygone political era that no longer commands majoritarian assent and yet is able to
maintain disproportionate national influence. Rigidity has immediate costs insofar as it prevents
correction of what some perceive as unjust or dysfunctional parts of the 1787 Constitution, such
as the Senate’s apportionment rule, the ill-defined scope of executive power, and the use of life
tenure for federal judges.97 These concerns have prompted proposals of an extra-textual
plebiscitary mechanism for fundamental change without supermajoritarian consent.98
‘Dead hand’ criticism need not collapse into wholesale rejection of constitutional
entrenchment. Even an ardent majoritarian can in good conscience endorse off-the-rack
governance structures to reduce the transaction costs of governing by eliminating each
successive generation’s need to recreate basic democratic frameworks.99 She might also endorse
the 1787 Constitution as an adequate if imperfect “blueprint for democratic governance” in
which there is some circulation of elective officer-holders and a framework that both reduces the
risk of defection100 and also “discourage[s] frivolous attempts to revise the Constitution every
time political deadlock occurs.”101 That is, endorsing majoritarianism is not the same as rejecting
constitutionalism. Nevertheless, even if some constitutional entrenchment is desirable, Article V
may still go too far. After all, many other constitutions operate without its extreme rigidity. It is
hard to see why the United States needs so much more textual rigidity than other countries.
See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional Entrenchment, 29
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 251 (1996) (developing objection from democracy to constitutional inflexibility);
see also Levinson, Political Implications, supra note 61, at 123 (accepting the justification for entrenchment in some
cases, such as the First Amendment, but also arguing that there are “no good reasons to support the formal status
engendered by Article V” on other questions). It is important to note that constitutional binding is dissimilar from
the kind of self-dealing that individuals engage in (with the most famous example being Ulysses tying himself to the
mast) in as much as the Founding generation and current generations are wholly different entities. See JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES UNBOUND 92 (2000) [hereinafter ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND].
96
Holmes, Precommitment, supra note 93, at 195 (“Why should a minority of our fellow citizens be empowered to
prevent amendments to the Constitution?”).
97
See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 25–158; accord ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW
DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2001) (developing arguments from democratic theory against
current national democratic structures).
98
See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 8, at 457 (explaining that citizens have a legal right to amend the
Constitution “via majoritarian and populist mechanism akin to a national referendum, even though that mechanism
is not explicitly specified in Article V”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the
Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1988) (arguing for “constitutional amendment by
direct appeal to, and ratification by, We the People of the United States”).
99
STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 163 (1995) (comparing
constitutional rules to grammatical rules, which “do not merely retrain a speaker” but also “allow interlocutors to do
many thanks they would not otherwise have been able to do or even have thought of doing”).
100
Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and Some Implications for
Contested Presidential Elections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1995 (2003); see also Jon Elster, Intertemporal Choice and
Political Thought, in CHOICE OVER TIME, 35, 38 (Jon Elster & G. Loewenstein, eds., 1992) [hereinafter Elster,
Intertemporal Choice] (“The purpose of entrenched clauses … is to ensure a reasonable degree of stability in the
political system and to protect minority rights.”).
101
HOLMES, supra note 99, at 155.
95
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A second line of criticism of Article V identifies a failure to accommodate specific
constituencies in the amendment process. Hence, Article V is criticized both as being too
friendly to the several states and as evincing excessive hostility to local interests. On the one
hand, Article V is condemned for allocating too large a role to the states qua political entities, in
lieu of reflecting the preferences of citizens on a roughly per capita basis.102 Given the peculiar
political geography of the United States, this means a “large majority [must] dread and
sometimes submit to constitutional innovations appealing only to a minority.” 103 On the other
hand, different critics allege that the national convention mechanism for proposing amendments
is so “broken” that Congress maintains an “effective veto” on constitutional change and uses it
exclusively to “promote amendments that accord with its own preferences.”104 Another profederalism critique argues Article V is flawed because it creates agency slack between the
national electorate and its various representatives in federal and state governments. 105 On the
latter view, Congress’s de facto agenda-control over the process of constitutional amendment
pursuant to Article V may “expand the federal government and increas[e] Congress’s ability to
extract rents and redistribute wealth.”106 On this view, extensions of the franchise achieved by
the fifteenth, nineteenth, and twenty-sixth amendment are not occasions for celebration, but are
to be condemned as efforts to “provid[e] a source of voters [for] the enacting coalition” and
thereby “increas[e] the likelihood of redistribution of wealth through government.”107
Criticism of Article V, however, is not universal. A handful of commentators claim that
because the Constitution’s original design was optimal, it makes sense to make formal change as
costly as possible.108 Taking constitutional perfection yet further, other commentators propose
102

Writing in the early 1960s, Charles Black thus identified and condemned the possibility of a successful
constitutional amendment being enacted with the support of a bare 40 percent of the nation’s population. See Black,
supra note 25, at 959.
103
Id.
104
Rappaport, supra note 3, at 1512–13. To the extent that this argument is founded on an originalist claim about
federalism, it is puzzling As Kyvig explains, however, the supermajority rules of Article V already “reflected the
Founders’ vision of federalism” and the appropriate level of deference to states. KYVIG, supra note 27, at 471. To
criticize Article V on federalism grounds, Kyvig suggests, is to second-guess the Framers’ calibration of the federalstate balance. Interestingly, Rappaport goes far beyond the position of the celebrated states’ rights advocate John
Calhoun, who anticipated that Article V would protect the South from Northern domination up to the point where
secession would be required. See John C. Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United
States, in A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES 111, 158 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1968). This again suggests that Rappaport’s baseline conception of
federalism at work is non-originalist in nature.
105
Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional
Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 161–62 (1993).
106
Id. at 115; id. at 129–30 (arguing that “many of the amendments indirectly facilitated the institutional ability of
Congress to serve as a source of rents”).
107
Id. at 143. Boudreaux and Pritchard imply that these expansions of the franchise, which are generally seen as
normative desirable and indeed long overdue, were in fact welfare-reducing. They thus argue that giving AfricanAmericans and women the vote “exacerbate[d] the collective-action problem of the electorate generally” by
“reduc[ing] average voter monitoring of politicians.” Id. at 143. They hence seem to assume that African-Americans
and women ought always to be have excluded from the electorate—a view I do not share.
108
See, e.g., Joseph R. Long, Tinkering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573, 580, 589 (1915) (“The constitution
of the United States is justly regarded as the greatest instrument of government ever ordained by man. For more than
a century it stood almost unchanged….. The present mode of amendment assures its stability while permitting
natural evolution.”); see also LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINSCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
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that Article V has in fact enabled an effective sorting of good, ratified amendments from
undesirable, unratified amendments.109
Neither line of defense, however, is successful. Both reason backward from the perceived
perfection of the original 1787 text and later constitutional amendments. But the original
constitution contained explicit protections for the slave trade and awarded representational
subsidies based on states’ possession of slave populations.110 Nor are all subsequent amendments
equally laudable.111 For example, amendments now hymned for their emancipatory, democracypromoting consequences may also have had the perverse collateral effect of strengthening other
kinds of political exclusion.112 Other amendments now celebrated for rectifying errors in the
1787 constitution failed for decades to have meaningful effect on the ground.113 It requires a
pinched field of vision to discern perfection in these outcomes. Nor does the historical pattern of
failed amendments provide ground for Whiggish enthusiasm. Among the failed amendments
littering American history are proposals that today would likely be viewed by many as desirable,
including bans on child labor,114 equal rights for women,115 and the full enfranchisement of
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 164 (2004) (arguing that “the Article V requirements for the amendment of the
Constitution are an attractive part of the pragmatic justice-seeking quality to our constitutional institutions”);
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1720 (“[T]he rules for enacting and amending the United States
Constitution are in large measure desirable.”). These arguments for the Constitution’s optimality rest on the
epistemic benefits of Article VII’s supermajoritarian character of Article VII, id. at 1096 (invoking Condorcet’s jury
theorem); and on the idea that Article V’s obduracy prompted the Framers to take into account the interests of
subsequent generations, Sager, supra, at 164 (“The obduracy of the Constitution to amendment requires of members
of the ratifying generation that they chose for the Constitution principles and provisions not just for themselves but
for their children.”). Neither of these arguments is persuasive, even aside from obvious flaws in the 1787
Constitution. First, it is not clear the demanding conditions for Condorcetian epistemic advantage, in particular the
assumption of uncorrelated errors, and were in fact met in 1787. See Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic
Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 277, 286 (2001). To the contrary, the
intensive deliberations around the Constitution undermine any inference that the condition of independent errors was
satisfied. Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 30 (2009). And because a 1787 supermajority is
numerically smaller than a 2012 majority, id. at 11, the Condorcet’s theorem favors the latter and not the former.
Second, Sager’s argument in favor of Article V assumes that constitutional rigidity induced members of the
Founding generation to act in a benevolent way, by taking into account the preferences of future generations. But
Sager does not explain either how the Founding generations could intuit what those preferences would be, or what
induces a benevolent—as opposed to a condescending or hostile—view of future generations.
109
This is an argument invoked by scholars at opposite poles of the political spectrum. Compare Erwin
Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561, 1564 (1998) (arguing that “most of the ratified
amendments, by any measure, were desirable revisions”), with McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1724–28
(lauding Article V on the basis of proposed amendments that have failed).
110
See DAVID WALDENSTEICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION 3, 71–105
(2009) (noting six constitutional clauses that “directly” concern slavery, and five others known by the Framers to
have important effects on slavery—all but one of which “protect[ed] slavery”).
111
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1697.
112
For example, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted in a way that confirmed the exclusion of
women from the mandatory franchise, and was understood to do so at the time. See Richard M. Re & Christopher
M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584,
1612–13 (2012) (discussing enactment history).
113
Hence, the mere enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments did not redress the compounding effects of
slavery. For a recent, narrative account of this history see DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME:
THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACKS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2009).
114
J. Res. 13, 36th Cong., 12 Stat. 251 (1861).
115
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92nd Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
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citizens residing in the District of Columbia.116 It is hardly obvious these measures were “of
doubtful value,”117 or that the nation was better off upon their defeat. Defenses of Article V
grounded in constitutional perfectionalism, in short, rest on highly controversial normative and
empirical judgments.118 They cannot be sustained without implausible assumptions about the
wisdom of the Founding generation and the precision of Article V as a sorting device.
*

*

*

Article V, in sum, presents a puzzle. Constitutions tend to survive when they are flexible.
Yet our Constitution is both among the world’s most rigid and its oldest. This is anomalous and
calls for explanation. The rigidity of Article V, moreover, generates a suite of trenchant
normative critiques. To date, its defenders have failed to respond to those charges. They have
failed to answer Patrick Henry’s question: Why so much rigidity?
II.

The Function of Article V in the Early Republic

This Part develops an answer to Part I’s puzzle by showing that Article V-induced
rigidity can foster constitutional longevity. Drawing on recent literature on long-term
contracting, it identifies two beneficial effects from textual inflexibility that may conduce to
constitutional survival during the first few decades of a constitution’s existence. First, rigidity
mitigates a potentially fatal ‘hold-up’ problem that can preclude constitutional ratification and
discourage vital investments in the institutions needful to make a new constitution work in its
early decades. Second, the post-ratification investments induced by textual rigidity catalyze a
virtuous circle, yielding long-term anchoring effects. My aim here is to show that both
mechanisms are possible in theory and to offer evidence of their operation during the early
Republic.119
I should clarify at the outset that my claim is not about the original expectations of the
Framers even though it is focused on the first decades of the Constitution’s existence. I do not
claim that the Framers envisaged or intended the mechanism limned here. The drafting history of
the Constitution, and indeed eighteenth-century political science more generally, evinced scant
grasp of the “difficulties encountered in conceptualizing and modeling incomplete
contracting.”120 “[R]ealistic and gifted as they were, many of their key assumptions proved to be
false, and the constitution they created has survived not because of their predictions but in spite
of them.”121 My claim thus concerns actual not intended effects. To adapt Adam Ferguson’s
dictum, our Constitution’s survival may be “the result of human action, but not the execution of
any human design.”122
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H.R.J. Res. 554, 95th Cong. 92 Stat. 3795 (1978).
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 5, at 1726.
118
Cf. Henry Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981) (arguing against claims that the
Constitution supplies solutions to all emergent social problems).
119
To be clear, my claim is about the value of textual rigidity early in the life of a constitution. As Part III.C
explains, rigidity is likely substantially less desirable in later periods of constitutional development.
120
Tirole, supra note 11, at 742.
121
DAHL, supra note 97, at 141.
122
ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 110 (F. Oz-Salzberger, ed. 1995) (1767).
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This Part begins by explaining why it is appropriate to model the Constitution as an
incomplete contract. It then introduces relevant concepts and findings from the literature on
transaction costs in contracting. The central sections of this Part then apply those concepts to the
constitutional context. My aim in so doing is not to show a precise fit between private-law
mechanisms and public-law dynamics. Rather, the extensive private law literature serves as a
launching point for specification of similar—not identical—dynamics in the constitutional
context. I conclude by offering evidence that the mechanisms described here operated in the
early Republican context.
A.

The Constitution as a Long-Term Relational Contract

There is a large literature analyzing constitutions as contracts.123 Because it yields at least
two ways of modeling a constitution as a contract, we can usefully begin by clarifying which sort
of model this Article will pursue.
1.

Two Views of Constitutions as Contracts

First, and most obviously, a constitution can be viewed as a contract between citizens and
the state. This version of “constitution as contract” is, of course, familiar from normative
political philosophy. For instance, John Locke famously identified the emergence of a “compact”
through the agreement of citizens with the aim of “mutual preservation of … lives, liberties, and
estates.”124 The Lockean view conduces to normative questions about the scope of authority
delegated to the state and the rights reserved to the people. It is less useful as a heuristic for
understanding constitutional stability simply because it is not the people per se that pose a threat
to constitutional stability. With the exception of rare instances of massive popular unrest, it is not
generally the people as an undifferentiated whole that imperils constitutional survive. 125 Rather,
“[o]rdinary people often play a peripheral role in the breakdown of democracy.” 126 A
heterogeneous and geographically diffuse population will rarely be able to challenge the state in
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ELKINS et al., ENDURANCE, supra note 1, at 66–72 (making the analogy and drawing on the incomplete
contracting literature); Stefan Voigt, Constitutional Political Economy: Analyzing Formal Institutions at the Most
Elementary Level, in NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: A GUIDEBOOK 363, 367–68 (E. Brousseau & J. Glachant,
eds., 2008); Sutter, supra note 13, at 139; accord Aghion & Bolton, supra note 13, at 38–41. Another line of
theoretical work focuses on the problems of “self-enforcing constitutions” but takes up essentially the same set of
concerns and problems. See, e.g., Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an
Application to Democratic Stability in America’s First Century, 28 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 2 (2010); see also Yadeira
González de Lara, Avner Greif & Saumitra Jha, The Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing Constitution, 98
AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 105, 105 (2008) (describing the rule of law as an example of “equilibria
with rulers constrained by those ‘administrators’ who implement policies”).
124
JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, IN TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 142, 155 (Ian Shapiro, ed., 2003).
125
Hence, some argue that regimes can be deposed through unmediated popular action. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT,
ON REVOLUTION 38 (rev ed. 2006) (identifying at least the start of the 1789 French revolution with a “multitude on
the march” … “the multitude of the poor and the downtrodden, who every century had been hidden in darkness and
shame”). Another example of a populist revolt, less well recalled today, is the French Commune of 1871; for a
concise history, see ALISTAIR HORNE, THE TERRIBLE YEAR: THE PARIS COMMUNE, 1871 (1971).
126
NANCY BERMEO, ORDINARY PEOPLE IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES: THE CITIZENRY AND THE BREAKDOWN OF
DEMOCRACY 19-20 (2003) (developing the point that “popular defection from democracy is not as common as some
of the more tragic cases of democratic collapse have led us to believe”)
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the absence of intermediating institutions such as political parties or ethnic or religious
organizations.127 Hence, I do not pursue this way of analyzing the Constitution any further.
Instead, this Article builds upon the second model of the constitution as contract. This
second model focuses not on the relationship between the people and the state, but on
interactions between the various major interest groups that compete for state power. In this
model, a written constitution can be understood as a contract between those diverse powerful
parties—be they states (as in the U.S. context), economically powerful interest groups, or even
tribes or ethnic groupings—whose cooperation is needful to establishing a long-term cooperative
relationship and to enable mutually beneficial cooperative action. Because it trains more
explicitly and directly on the most common causes of constitutional death, this model provides
the more salient lens for analyzing problems of constitutional survival. Hence, this way of
modeling constitutions has been employed profitably in explaining how judicial review arose in
certain Asian countries as a form of “insurance” for both “prospective governing parties” and
“prospective opposition parties” that alike feared permanent lock-out of government after
electoral defeat.128
This Article thereafter models the U.S. Constitution as a deal between powerful interest
groups rather than as the product of popular sovereignty. I take this approach not because the
latter is normative disreputable or irrelevant but because it does not capture the dynamics most
relevant to the risk factors for constitutional demise. Moreover, I do not provide a precise
algorithm for determining which interest groups are salient to the analysis in the U.S. context. It
suffices here to state that organized groups are relevant insofar as their agreement in an original
constitutional deal is necessary for an ensuing regime to be resilient against significant shocks. In
the American context, for example, this obviously includes the thirteen states and likely also
organized, economically powerful interest groups, such as creditors, merchants, and
slaveholders.129 Despite the absence of any textual language respecting secession, states de facto
had the power to threaten exit from the Union, as the events of the 1860s amply show. 130 I am
agnostic as to whether the relevant pool of parties needs to be expanded further, and hence
disclaim any effort at superfluous precision. Rather, I focus on the question of how the
Constitution induced stability by encouraging all necessary parties to enter the initial
constitutional deal and then by dissuading them from exiting in destabilizing ways during the
acutely vulnerable first two decades of the early Republic.131
127

The basic collective action problem is identified in MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 34 (1965).
128
TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 25 (2003).
129
See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
19–51 (rev. ed. 1985) (cataloguing “economic interests” active in the Founding period, and including slaveholders,
creditors, and the “innumerable manufacturing, shipping, trading, and commercial interests”).
130
There are independent reasons not to include a textual right of secession. See MIKHAIL FILIPPOV, PETER C.
ORDESHOOK & OLGA SHVETSOVA, DESIGNING FEDERALISM: A THEORY OF SELF-SUSTAINABLE FEDERAL
INSTITUTIONS 105 (2004) (“A formally recognized right of secession … legitimates the view that the existing union
can be dissolved and recreated on new terms ….”).
131
This model glosses over a number of important difficulties. First, it applies a model of individual precommitment
to collectivities (such as states and interest groups) that have diverse degrees of internal organization and formal
decisional capacity. Cf. Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come To It: Some Ambiguities and
Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1758–60 (2003) [hereinafter Elster, Don’t Burn Your
Bridge]. Second, it ignores the fact that the composition of a state’s population changes over time, such that a
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To view the Constitution as a contract is to surface two important qualities. First, a
constitution qua contract has a long-term, relational quality in that it involves not merely an
instantaneous exchange of goods (such as one sees on spot markets) but also the making of
durable cooperative interactions by all parties in order to create a contractual surplus.132 Second,
the constitution qua contract is incomplete in the sense that the contracting parties have not
written down contractual solutions to all possible future contingencies.133 Incompleteness arises
for several reasons. A threshold one relates to the high cost of imagining and resolving all
possible contingencies in a single document.134 In the constitutional context especially, it is
impossible for drafters, who have limited time and political capital, to anticipate and to write
down all possible future states of the world, let alone to provide comprehensive and
unambiguous governance solutions for all those states of the world.135 Both the “cost of
processing and using … information” about potential states of the world and “the cost of writing
a contingent contract in a sufficiently clear and unambiguous way that it can be enforced”136
ensure that most contracts are in some measure incomplete. Further, even with unlimited time
and political capital, bounded rationality would prevent drafters from complete specification of a
constitution as contract.137
The relational quality and the incompleteness of a constitution qua contract are
intertwined. As the expected duration and complexity of the relations underpinning a constitution
increase, the costs of writing down ex ante solutions for all future contingencies grows, if only

constitution as contract eventually binds a class of persons who were not alive at the point of contracting. ELSTER,
ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 95, at 98. To the extent I am concerned here with the first two generations after the
Constitution’s ratification, the second difficulty may be mitigated here.
132
See Melvin Eisenberg, Relational Contracts, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 291, 291–96 (Jack
Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1994) (discussing possible definitions of “relational contract”); see also Ian
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational
Contract Law, 72 NW. U.L. REV. 854, 856 (1978) (coining the term “relational contract”).
133
See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 299 (2004) [hereinafter SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS] (“An aspect of contractual practice is … is that contracts are significantly incomplete [because they]
omit all manner of variables and contingencies that are of potential relevance to the contracting parties.”). Tirole
argues that “there is unfortunately no clear definition of ‘incomplete contracting’ in the literature” but assumes a set
of restrictions on the standard model of contracts based on unforeseen contingencies, the cost of writing contracts,
and the cost of enforcing contracts. Tirole, supra note 11, at 743–44.
134
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 70 (1985) (mapping different governance
solutions in contracting) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS] (“[F]or long-term contracts executed
under conditions of uncertainty, complete presentation is apt to be prohibitively costly if not impossible.”); accord
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 133, at 299; Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 696 (1986) (hypothesizing “a
situation in which it is prohibitively difficult to think about and describe unambiguously in advance how all the
potentially relevant aspects of the production allocation should be chosen as a function of the many states of the
world”). In addition to the reasons for incompleteness listed in the main text, Shavell also lists enforcement costs
and the impossibility of judicial verification. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 133, at 300. Because those
grounds are not relevant to my analysis, I do not address them here further.
135
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 70.
136
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755, 756 (1988)
[hereinafter Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation].
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Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, 319, 322 (C. Ménard &
M.M. Shirley, ed. 2005) [hereinafter Joskow, Vertical Integration].
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because the range of contingencies grows as a constitution’s expected lifespan increases.138 A
basic insight of this contracting literature therefore is that there is a “trade-off between rigidity
and flexibility” analogous to the one that exists in constitutional design between the benefits of
specification and the gains from adaption.139
2.

The Hold-up Problem in Private Contracting

A large law-and-economics literature about barriers to contracting developed in the wake
of Ronald Coase’s famous article asking why contracting parties opt to internalize a transaction
within a firm rather than using the market.140 Coase’s analysis identified a comparison of the
marginal “costs of organizing” production inside and outside the firm as pivotal to this
decision.141 When the costs of organizing through market mechanisms are relatively high, it is
worth fashioning a long-term and relational incomplete contract—i.e., the firm. Coase’s insight
generated a range of hypotheses about how incomplete, relational contracts can be designed to
address problems specifics to particular industries and parties.142 His analysis pointed toward
different ways in which contracts could respond to heterogeneous barriers to contracting,143
including adverse selection problems, information asymmetries,144 and the need for highpowered rather than low-powered incentives to make a contract succeed.145
One kind of private contracting problem has special relevance for understanding the role
of textual rigidity in ‘constitutions qua contracts.’ It is the problem of “hold-ups,”146 otherwise
known as the problem of “post-contractual opportunist behavior.”147 Hold-up problems can arise
whenever parties must make post-contractual investments in assets specific to their
relationship.148 An investment-backed asset is specific when a contracting party’s next-best
return from the asset is substantially less than the return from the asset within the context of the
138

Some commentators go so far as to define relational contracts in terms of their incompleteness. See, e.g., Charles
Goetz & Robert Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981) (“A contract is
relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined
obligations.”).
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Compare Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q. J. ECON. 1, 2 (2008) [hereinafter
Hart & Moore, Contracts as Reference Points], with Elster, Intertemporal Choice, supra note 100, at 43 (identifying
the need to find “an optimal balance between stability and rigidity” in constitutional design); accord Ferejohn, supra
note 40, at 502.
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RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 1–31 (1988).
141
Id. at 31.
142
See Pierre Garrouste & Stéphane Saussier, The Theories of the Firm, in BROUSSEAU & GLACHANT, supra note
123, at 23, 24 (exploring the “competing theories of the firm” developed after Coase); WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 79, fig. 3.2.
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For an early survey, see Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure
Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 114–22 (1971) (listing four species of market failures that “involve
transaction costs that can be attenuated by substituting internal organization and market exchange”).
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WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 81–83.
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Garrouste & Saussier, supra note 142, at 28.
146
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 133, at 326–27 (discussing a range of hold-up problems); see also Victor P.
Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCI. 626, 439–41 (1976)
(describing hold up problem as one or providing protection for the “right to be served”).
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Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).
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WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 134, at 52–54.
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contractual relationship.149 Imagine a printing press built with specifications for a particular
newspaper that generates a joint annual surplus of $1.5 million, where the next-best use of the
press (for a different publisher with distinctive and different needs) would yield only
$500,000.150 Once the press has made its investment, the newspaper can threaten to breach in
order to extort a greater share of the jointly produced surplus from the investing party.151
Because the second-best use of the asset pays out much less to the investing party, the latter
stands to realize a large loss by walking away from the contract. Accordingly, it is rational to
accede to renegotiation.152 Even when the dependency is bilateral, the possibility of hold-up can
still lead to haggling that dissipates the gains from trade.153
The potential for hold-up has both ex ante and ex post effects. Ex ante, a potential
investing party will rationally anticipate the possibility of hold-up and so decline to enter into
contracts where that risk exists.154 Otherwise Pareto-superior deals will, as a result, remain
unrealized. Ex post, parties that do enter deals will dissipate resources on both hold-ups and
resistance to hold-ups, resulting in intracontractual disputes and haggling that expend resources
without commensurate social gain.155 Solving the hold-up problem is valuable, therefore,
because it enables otherwise Pareto-superior deals to be negotiated and honored in ways that
maximize their value.
The relationship-specificity of assets created by post-contractual investment and the
consequent specter of a hold-up can be observed across the landscape of private contracting.156
Consider, for example, a coal-burning power generation facility that benefits from being located
at the “mouth” of a mine, but that thereby renders itself vulnerable to hold-up.157 Or think of an
automobile manufacturer that may wish for a subsidiary supplier to invest in specialized
manufacturing hardware, and even to co-locate, in order to minimize production costs, only to

See Joskow, Vertical Integration, supra note 137, at 322 (“[R]elationship-specific investments are investments
which, once made, have a value in alternative uses that is less than the value in the use originally intended to support
a particular trading relationship”).
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find that the supplier baulks out of a fear of hold-up.158 It is even possible to find hold-ups in
contracts over human capital. A famous example involves the tough bargaining by actor James
Gandolfini over whether he would appear in later seasons of the lucrative HBO series The
Sopranos, which resulted in the actor roughly doubling his $400,000 per episode salary—the
network being the object of the hold-up.159 As these examples suggest, an investment’s
specificity can take many forms, from location to physical design or human capital allocations.160
The hold-up problem may be also especially acute in circumstances in which a post-contractformation investment is cooperative in nature in that it “generate[s] a direct benefit for the
trading partner.161 Such cooperative investments are “critically important in modern
manufacturing.”162 Empirical studies confirm that the hold-up problem is not merely
hypothetical, but has significant cost-efficiency effects in contracting.163
Hold-up problems arise in both incomplete and complete contracts, albeit in different
ways. Hold-up can arise either when an incomplete contract does not address an unexpected
exogenous event that provokes one party to seek renegotiation or when post-contracting
investments expose one party to others’ opportunism. With a complete contract, changed
circumstances can also lead to hold-up.164 For instance, Gandolfini’s contract was likely
complete in the sense that it specified a salary.165 The latter dispute can hence be described either
in terms of an incomplete or a complete contract: It either concerned the breach of a complete
contract followed by de novo deal-making (from HBO’s perspective), or the modification of an
incomplete contract that did not state when modifications were permitted (from Gandolfini’s
view). The problem can accordingly be framed either as one of contractual commitment or gapfilling. For the purposes of this Article, there is little need to distinguish between these two
characterizations, even if the distinction has significance in the private contracting context.
There are several ways of mitigating the potential for hold-ups, not all of which translate
well into the public-law context. Among the first solutions to be identified in the law-andeconomics literature involved vertical integration. One firm would purchase the other and
thereby eliminate the possibility of interfirm hold-up.166 Arranging deals within the firm,
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although it mitigates the hold-up problem, is not costless. Rather, it “sacrifices the high-powered
incentive advantages of market exchange and, consequently, demands greater investments in
monitoring and administration.”167 Some evidence nevertheless suggests that integration
“becomes more likely in the presence of relationship-specific human capital.”168 However
promising as a private-law solution, vertical integration cannot be transposed easily to the publiclaw context. A constitution cannot by mere ipse dixit dissolve a diverse and conflictive pool of
interest groups into a harmonious whole.
A second possible solution is to draft the contract to include various complex
mechanisms that dampen renegotiation.169 For example, a leading analysis postulates that
mechanisms for verifiable communication between parties in some circumstances will enable the
maintenance of efficient investment levels.170 Like vertical integration, the specific contractual
solutions proposed in this line of analysis do not translate easily into the context of constitutions
as contract.171 An exception is the possibility of “offering to the potential cheater a future
‘premium,’ more precisely, a price sufficiently greater than average variable (that is, avoidable)
cost to assert a quasi-rent stream that will exceed the potential gain from cheating.”172 Examples
of the latter mechanism include long-term implicit contracts with particular suppliers and
interfirm reciprocity agreements, both of which create an enduring stream of benefits the presentdiscounted value of which is greater than the benefits from cheating.173 As explained below,
something akin to this mechanism might be discerned in the American constitutional context,
although there are easier ways of modeling the solution found in the public-law context.
The third solution to hold-ups explored in the private-law literature does, however, bear
directly on public law problems. Indeed, this solution may paradoxically be easier to employ in
the public-law context than in the private-law context. This is the possibility of declining to
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enforce modifications to a contract.174 After two parties sign a contract that requires relationshipspecific investments on the part of Party A, that is, a court asked to enforce a modification of the
contract elicited by Party B will demur, and instead enforce the terms of the contract as
originally drafted. A rule against modification of this kind “assures prospective contract parties
that signing a contract is not stepping into a trap” and so enables Pareto-superior deals.175
In practice, the effect of no-modification clauses pursuant to American contract law is
unclear. The “pre-existing duty rule” sometimes has the effect of barring certain sorts of
modifications, and hence mitigates certain hold-up problems.176 For example, in the case-book
staple of Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined
to enforce a salary-increasing modification negotiated by the crew of a fishing vessel in the midst
of an Alaska salmon run, at a time at which no substitute crew could possibly be found.177
In other instances, though, “courts simply ignor[e] the pre-existing duty rule” or find
ways to circumvent it.178 “Freedom of contract” principles are often cited as ground for such
refusals.179 Even more problematic is the fact that “[t]hose who make a contract, may unmake
it…. Whenever two men contract, no limitation self-imposed can destroy their power to contract
again.”180 In other words, there is a generally available mechanism for the rendering nomodification clauses nugatory—which is to enter into a side-contract that counteracts the terms
of a chronologically earlier contract.181 These difficulties have provoked arguments in favor of
adopting a more formal rule in favor of the “enforcement of contractual terms constraining
modifications.”182
If no-modification clauses resolve a hold-up problem that can arise in private law
contracting (both for incomplete and complete contracts), can they be employed to address
analog concerns in the public law context? An alternative answer is developed in the next
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optimal price would in principle be desirable ….”); Graham & Pierce, supra note 151, at 9–10 (noting the risk of
holdup as a justification for judicial nonenforcement of a contract). For early treatments of the possibility, see
Varouj A. Aivazian, Michael J. Trebilcock, & Michael Penny, The Law of Contract of Modifications: The Uncertain
Quest for a Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 173 (1984); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981).
175
Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
176
See CORBIN, supra note 17, at §171, at 105 (“[N]either the performance of a duty nor the promise to render a
performance already required by duty is sufficient consideration for a return promise.”). The Uniform Commerce
Code allows good faith modifications. U.C.C. §2-209(1) & cmt. 1 (1987).
177
Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902); see also LingenfeldeGr v. Wainwright Brewing
Co., 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 44 (1891); Rose v. Daniels, 8 R.I. 381 (1866). Other examples of pre-existing duty rules
include price-regulation statutes, see SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 133, at 343, admiralty rules for salvage,
see Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 150 (1856), and utility regulations, see Goldberg, supra note 156, at 426. Since
Alaska Packers concerned a fixed term (salary), it might be characterized as a case about enforcement simpliciter.
But note that from the crew’s perspective, the case concerned an incomplete term—specifically the conditions for
modification.
178
Graham & Peirce, supra note 151, at 15.
179
For an exemplary statement of freedom of contracting, see, e.g., Continental Basketball Ass'n, Inc. v. Ellenstein
Enters., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Ind. 1996).
180
Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 278, 387–88 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.).
181
Jolls observes that it is possible in some contexts to prevent side-contracting. Jolls, supra note 12, at 230–31.
182
Id. at 236.
174

27

section. But as a threshold matter, notice a key difference between private and public law
contexts. In the private law context, courts are unwilling to enforce no-modification clauses and
it is hard to prevent parties contracting around the clause via a new, offsetting contract. But a
defining feature of the constitutional context is the absence of effective third-party
enforcement.183 Supreme Courts and their ilk, after all, are “the product of constitutional
negotiation,” not extrinsic to the constitutional order.184 It is the parties themselves who must
necessarily make the decision whether or not to comply with a constitution, seek amendment, or
withdraw. Unlike in the private-law context, no-modification clauses in the public law context
can effectively take an option (modification) off the table. The parties are effectively moved by
such a clause from a three-option situation (adhere to the contract, modify, or exit) to a twooption world (adherence or exit). As a consequence, the reasons that no-modification clauses are
not more commonly employed in the private-law context do not translate well into the public-law
domain.
It is also worth noting that no-modification clauses in private contracts are perceived as
having nontrivial collateral costs. An across-the-board rule of contractual inflexibility might have
benefits but it also impedes otherwise warranted adjustments in light of changed circumstances.
Proposals to enforce no-modification rules as a result often suggest an exception for contractual
responses to unanticipated and exogenous changes in background circumstances. 185 Some longterm contracts already attempt to draw a distinction between desirable and undesirable
modifications. For example, “prime plus” clauses in loan agreements and “price protection”
clauses with pari passu effect in supply contracts in effect operate as sorting devices to allow
some desirable forms of change, but not undesirable change motivated by hold-ups.186
In sum, an extensive literature concerning private contracting has identified a spectrum of
transaction costs that impede the formation or consummate execution of durational contracts. An
important strand of that literature identifies hold-up as a risk: the exploitation of parties who
have invested in relationship-specific assets that lock them into a contract. Among the solutions
offered in the literature is the possibility of no-modification clauses. While there are reasons
these are not (yet) common in ordinary contracting, those reasons do not translate well into the
public law context.
B.

The Role of Textual Rigidity in Promoting Constitutional Survival

The foregoing discussion sets the stage for an account of the causal mechanism linking
constitutional rigidity to constitutional survival. Succinctly stated, the mechanism works as
follows: In conditions in which cooperative investments are pivotal to the survival of a novel
constitution order, a well-crafted constitution might plausible be written with an onerous
amendment rule akin to Article V. This amendatory provision operates much like a nomodification rule in ordinary contracting: It switches the parties’ choice set from three options—
adhere to the contract, modify, or exit—to two—adherence or exit. This change elicits parties
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entrance to the constitution as contract ex ante, and then renders more likely cooperative
investments that otherwise would be put on hold or rationed for fear of hold-ups.
We can take the analysis one step further. Notice that textual rigidity takes the ‘modify’
option off the table but not the ‘exit’ option. Indeed, as in the private law context, it is hard to see
how the exit option could be effectively eliminated absent the use of violence or coercion. And
yet, even in the absence of coercion, it is possible that textual rigidity may also mitigate the risk
of outright exit from the constitutional order. Rigidity indirectly addresses the risk of exit by
eliciting cooperative investments from multiple parties toward the creation of new institutions
tied to a new constitution. The costs sunk by those parties into cooperatively produced
institutions have the effect of raising the stakes of departure for any of the parties. By making
exit more costly, rigidity makes it less likely. Threats of defection also become less credible. The
overall effect of textual rigidity is not just to address fears of midstream hold-up by opportunistic
contracting partners, that is, but also to elicit an entangling web of mutually beneficial
cooperative investments that enmesh all parties into a specific constitutional regime.
I analyze this causal mechanism in its two stages. First, I look more closely at the link
between constitutional rigidity and the hold-up problem. In the course of the argument, I point to
evidence that this mechanism operated in the early American republic. Second, I look at the link
between entangling institutions and constitutional survival. Again, I offer examples of specific
institutions that may have played this role in the decades immediately after ratification, which is
when rigidity has greatest utility.
1.

The Preconditions for Constitutional No-Modification Rules

If textual rigidity can mitigate the risk of ex ante failure to enter a Pareto-superior private
contract and the ex post underinvestment in the coproduction of goods under the contract, might
the same mechanism work at the constitutional level? A threshold step in answering this question
is to identify the circumstances under which hold-up is likely to be a problem, and to ascertain
whether the U.S. Constitution falls within this class of cases.
The problem of hold-up is likely to arise only when two preconditions are met:
oligopolistic political competition and a thin national institutional infrastructure. First,
constitutions installed in the absence of political competition pose no such concern. Thus, a
constitution imposed by dint of external military force,187 or by a single monopolistic political
party,188 need not be drafted with the risk of hold-up in mind. Second, drafters may rightly be
less concerned about hold-up when robust national institutions already exist because the latter
vitiate the need for new, post-ratification cooperative investments.189 Given these possibilities,
not every founding father or mother should be worried about the hold-ups problem. And in many
constitution-making contexts, it will be quite likely that either one or the other of these
preconditions for textual rigidity will not be met. Indeed, the absence of other rigid, long-lasting
constitutions that has been identified by Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton suggests that these two
conditions are rarely both satisfied.
187
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The period of the drafting and ratification of the U.S. Constitution, however, was
characterized by both oligopolistic political competition and a thin national institutional
infrastructure. First, the coalition in favor of more robust federal action viewed the several states
as not merely potential but actual spoilers of the cooperative enterprise of maintaining
independence from European domination and achieving economic flourishing.190 Prior to the
Philadelphia Convention, states had notoriously declined to accede to the Confederation
Congress’s fiscal and military requests despite the grave financial strains imposed by the
Revolutionary War.191 As early as 1782, Rhode Island had signaled that it would decline to ratify
a proposed five percent impost on imported goods.192 In 1786, New Jersey and New York also
indicated their unwillingness to continue contributions to the confederated fisc. 193 Internal
divisions in Congress also induced an “inability” on the national legislature’s part “to frame and
implement satisfactory foreign policies,” leaving states vulnerable to the maneuvers of European
great powers.194
A concern with states as potential spoilers was also reflected in the concessions made
during drafting and ratification to states that were implicitly or explicitly threatening exit from
the federal project. During the Philadelphia Convention, for example, small states resisted any
deviation from the Articles of Confederation rule of equal representation for each state.195 One
result of this pressure was the “Great Compromise,” involving different apportionment rules for
the federal House and the Senate.196 During ratification, the Constitution’s supporters also
evinced concern that pivotal states would decline to accede to the new document, imperiling the
entire exercise.197 That these concerns were powerful enough to alter the views of Madison and
others on a bill of rights suggests that the Framers’ concerns about defection from the national
process were substantial.198
The Framers’ obvious grounds for concern about states’ exit from the Constitution
creates a puzzle: Why did they not expressly bar secession in the text of the Constitution? Not
only was the Constitution silent on that point, but through the antebellum period there was a
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“lively and inconclusive debate over whether the Constitution permitted states to secede.”199 The
argument developed in the balance of this Part offers a reason for this silence: The Framers did
not typically rely on “parchment” prohibitions to attain structural design goals. 200 Instead, they
relied on clever institutional design to cultivate appropriate incentives and to produce stable
equilibrium. Reliance on textual rigidity to deter secession coheres with the indirect, structural
strategies deployed elsewhere in the Constitution to mitigate systemic risks.
Second, the several states as of 1787 were hardly equipped with robust national
institutions of the kind seen in Europe. To the contrary, a central aim of the new Constitution
was the creation of national institutions backed by cooperative investments that would
effectively produce much-needed public goods. Hence, in describing the impulse for a new
constitutional framework James Madison diagnosed in the pre-1787 confederation a “want of
concert in matters where common interest requires it … [a] defect . . . strongly illustrated in the
state of our commercial affairs,” a lacuna he attributed to “the perverseness of particular States
whose commerce is necessary.”201 States’ opportunism, Madison suggested, induced a dearth of
cooperative investments in national institutions with public-good characteristics.
Consistent with Madison’s concerns, the Philadelphia Convention opened with the
“recogn[ition] that the actions of individually rational states produced irrational results for the
nation as a whole.”202 Recalcitrance of the states, as noted above, had already imperiled the
nascent union. During the Revolutionary War, the requisitions system through which the
Continental Congress funded military efforts sometimes yielded only 37 percent of the monies
sought,203 with compliance dropping at moments to 12 percent with hostilities’ end.204 The
confederation’s ongoing inability to service foreign and domestic debts also posed a direct risk to
sovereignty, since it rendered the national government incapable of responding to great power
threats, exemplified by Spain’s closure of the Mississippi River and New Orleans, or foreign
policy irritants, such as the Barbary pirates.205 These failures made the case for new national
institutions all the more compelling.
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In this context, the Philadelphia Convention drafted a constitution that, unlike the Articles
of Confederation, would elicit cooperative investments from the states to build new national
institutions with a public-good aspect such as “military defense,” “a unified market for goods,
capital, and labor,”206 a new system for federal taxation, a new national military capacity, and a
new national financial system.207 Mindful of the Articles’ failure to elicit these goods, the
Convention instructed the Committee of Detail to allow the power “to legislate in all Cases for
the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are separately
incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of
individual Legislation.”208 Taking these steps, the Framers anticipated that states would reap
benefits an order of magnitude larger than their original contributions through the fostering a
wide array of new institutions.
In sum, both preconditions for textual rigidity—oligopolistic political competition and
infrastructural fragility—were present at the U.S. Founding. This distinct and perhaps rare
combination of circumstances explains why textual rigidity may have been the right approach to
the problem of stabilizing the U.S. Constitution.
2.

Textual Rigidity as a Response to the Strategic Threat of Amendment

How then did textual rigidity respond to the drafting problems that faced the
Constitution’s drafters? The mechanism has two elements. First, rigidity promotes constitutionspecific investments by reducing the threat of specific employment of the amendment power.
Second, those investments in turn locked in participants to the Constitution by making secession
more costly. To invoke Albert Hirschman’s terminology again, limiting the strategic use of
‘voice’ conduces to ‘loyalty,’ and then the prolonged exercise of ‘loyalty’ raises the cost of
exit.209 This section addresses the mechanism’s first element, while the second element is
examined in the following section
A strategic request for amendment is one made for the purpose of exploiting other
parties’ postratification investment in relationship-specific assets in order to extract a greater
share of the net surplus from constitution-making. For example, imagine a Constitution that
creates a single-member electoral system.210 Responding to the incentives created by that
arrangement, a national-level interest group might invest heavily in local networks of candidates
with close connections to the electorate, rather than developing a nationally recognized brand.
These investments contribute to the public good of stable political competition, but may be
vulnerable to the threat of strategic renegotiation. For example, an opposing interest group might
press an amendment directing the use of a party-list proportional representation system, which
206
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would undermine its competitor’s investments. If amendment was easy to achieve, even the mere
threat of such an amendment might elicit costly bargaining or even preclude investments in party
infrastructure ab initio. Other examples of hold-up can be imagined in the trade context. Imagine,
for example, an interest group that contributes to the national government’s investments in
banking infrastructure but foregoes development of its own monetary institutions. Its investments
are imperiled by an amendment proposing limits on national monetary authority and a
redistribution of such authority to the states. In both examples, the easier amendment is, the
cheaper strategic invocation of the amendment power becomes.
A strategic request for amendment need not focus on a point already crisply resolved in
constitutional text. Provided that other parties have relationship-specific investments in the
constitutional order, amendments can be invoked strategically to redistribute surpluses between
parties even in the absence of a textual settlement. Consider the example of American slavery.
The Constitution did not expressly prohibit or endorse slavery, although six of its provisions
implicitly endorsed and protected the practice.211 Arguments for the prohibition of slavery were
vociferously pressed in the antebellum period.212 It is telling that Congress’s response was not to
try to settle the matter by constitutional amendment or legislation, but instead to install a “gag
rule,” precluding debate on the matter213 and to pursue territorial compromises that delayed any
final reckoning.214 Bracketing the profound moral questions raised by such deferrals—e.g. the
question whether preservation of the Constitution warranted a deferment of (or even a failure to)
slavery’s resolution—these legislative responses can be understood as a recognition that slavery
presented questions then too divisive for resolution. In the same light, the rigor of Article V, and
in particular the singling out in Article V of the slave trade for an especially onerous and
restrictive amendment rule, can be construed as evidence that the Framers intimated the
possibility that slavery could be used as a wedge to split apart the Union. By making it all but
impossible to amend the Constitution in respect to slavery, the Framers delayed any reckoning
with that institution until the Union had gained sufficiently in strength to survive that rupture.215
Article V thus operated to preserve constitutional ambiguities as much as it protected elements of
the constitutional deal that had been set forth in clear text.216
In each of these examples, Article V operated akin to a no-modification rule in a privatelaw contract by effectively switched the parties’ choice set from ‘adhere-modify-exit’ to ‘adhere
or exit.’ This alteration in the parties’ options mitigated the risk of strategic requests for
amendment by making the expected payoff from such renegotiation ex ante much smaller. In this
211
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fashion, Article V took an option (seeking strategic amendments) that would have increased the
risk of hold-up largely off the table. Doing so both mitigated a reason not to ratify and removed a
source of post-ratification inefficiency.
Taking modification off the table has a positive effect on constitutional stability even
assuming exit remains a substantial possibility—although I will argue in a moment that textual
rigidity mitigates the risk of exit through another mechanism. Parties that would engage in
strategic hold-ups by seeking constitutional amendment in light of others’ asset-specific
investments cannot simply switch strategies in the face of a no-modification rule to threaten exit
so as to gain the same concessions. Amendment and exit are not fungible because constitutions
do not comprise single or even a single-digit number of rules. Rather, they typically bundle
plural packages of enabling rules and constraining rules together as a take-it-or-leave-it
package.217 All else being equal, it is likely that some sticks of the bundle benefit a party while
other sticks in the bundle impose undesirable constraints. By exiting, a party loses both the
benefits and the burdens of a constitution because exit is an all-or-nothing decision.218 By
contrast, renegotiation through amendment allows the same party to sort between the sticks of
the constitutional bundle, choosing for disapprobation only those measures it views as
undesirable. As a result, in the ordinary course of events, renegotiation of the constitutional deal
through amendment will be a far more attractive vehicle for strategic exploitation than wholesale
exit. The former, but not the latter, allows a potential defector to select the parts of the
constitutional bargain it finds beneficial. By taking modification off the table, textual rigidity
leaves open only the more costly option of exit.219 At least in some class of cases, an interest
group willing to game the amendment process will not chance the price of exit. Hence, once
modification is off the table, exit does not pick up all the slack.
3.

Subconstitutional Investments and the Risk of Exit

There is a second causal strand linking textual rigidity to constitutional survival. Beyond
mitigating hold-up, textual obduracy also dampens the allure of exit. The link between rigidity
and the mitigation of exit risk is not direct. It is mediated through subconstitutional institutions—
i.e., institutions not formally required by the text or reflected via textual amendment but instead
that necessarily emerge as part of the downstream functioning of a constitutional framework.220
Such institutions are needed to produce public goods, such as peaceful political competition,
economic growth, and national security, which justify a constitution’s creation. Two examples—
both developed below—include a political party system and a fiscal infrastructure.
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Textual rigidity enables the creation of such subconstitutional institutions since parties to
the constitution would not contribute to create such institutions without assurances against hold
ups. But the new institutional ecosystem is also independently causally efficacious because it
entangles those same parties in the constitutional order by fixing their investments in an assetspecific form. If those parties exit the constitution, they lose the tailored resources, knowledge,
and skills invested in the new institutional ecosystem. In this way, institutions enabled by textual
rigidity fostered greater lock-in to the underlying constitution and diminished resistance to
cooperative investments. This adds up to a virtuous circle—a set of “self-reinforcing processes
that [make] reversals increasingly unattractive.”221
This virtuous circle mechanism is grounded on the assumption that constitutions not only
establish basic governance frameworks but also “induc[e] the development of economic and
political organizations.”222 A new ecosystem of parties, institutions, and networks is necessary
for realizing welfare gains immanent in the incomplete constitutional bargain. In its absence, a
new constitutional framework would be a dead letter, and the public goods that government is
typically tasked with producing would never materialize. The necessary institutional ecosystem,
however, need not be memorialized in constitutional text. To the contrary, new parties,
institutions, and networks may take an exclusively subconstitutional form, as indeed they have in
the United States. Despite its ‘subconstitutional’ character—in the sense of being located
underneath the text of a constitution and not in that text—a new institutional ecosystem will
inevitably develop along a path tailored specifically to a particular constitution’s topography.
Elections, for example, create incentives to organize in specific ways in anticipation of
campaigns for political office in certain geographic jurisdictions.223 The fiscal infrastructure of a
new constitution will also induce certain patterns of investment and commercial activity, not
least by restricting or expanding the expected supply of credit. And by resolving public-good
problems that impede certain channels of internal commerce and external trade, a newly
constituted government may encourage investment in some trading relationships rather than
others.224
This asset-specific infrastructure for the production of public goods has the effect of
making exit from a constitution by a pivotal party less likely. It has value in large part because it
fits tightly a particular constitution’s text, but has “far less value under alternative institutional
arrangements.”225 For example, a political party ceases to be tailored if fundamental parameters
221
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of the voting system change, say making local linkages more important than national profiles.
Trade relationships with a country cease to have as much value if one’s country goes to war with
it. Currency becomes worthless without the central bank that backs it. The asset specificity of
cooperative investments raises the cost of exit for parties to the constitution who have “invest[ed]
in specialized skills, deepen[ed] relationships with other officials and organizations, and
develop[ed] particular political and social identities.”226 Over time, that is, the positive network
externalities from learning and adaption to a particular political or commercial context227 and the
correlative cost of switching to another institutional framework both grow.228 The expected loss
in value of cooperative investments becomes in effect a tax upon exit from the constitution. As
this tax on exit enlarges over time, parties can be increasingly confident that their investments
will not be turned against them. Confidence thus induces investment, which in turn fosters
greater confidence.
While perhaps small at inception, this locking-in effect grows over time through the
operation of a positive feedback mechanism.229 In the long term, that process tends to generate
“massive increasing returns” on an initial investment.230 Under these conditions, participants in a
constitutional system likely develop “[a]daptive expectations … because increased prevalence of
contracting based on a specific institution will reduce the uncertainties about the permanence of
the rule.”231 These expectations then further entrench the constitution,232 deepening the effect of
the virtuous circle mechanism.
4.

Subconstitutional Institutions with Lock-In Effects in the Early Republic

Are there example “of political institutions” enabled by the parsimonious text of the 1787
Constitution “to deal creatively with ongoing developments … outside the Constitution”?233 In
this section, I offer two case studies—political parties and the national financial infrastructure
that coalesced around the Bank of the United States. At the same time, I do not mean to imply
that these are the only such virtuously entrenching institutions. I focus on institutions that
emerged at the beginning of the Republic because it is during the first few decades that textual
rigidity was most likely to be useful. My claim here is that both subconstitutional institutions are
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 137, 144–45 (D. Lake & R. Powell, eds. 2000) (“Where investments in the specific
assets of an institution are high, actors will find the cost of any institutional change that endangers those assets to be
quite high; indeed actors in this situation may be reluctant to run risks of any change at all ….”).
229
See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitments, 124
HARV. L. REV. 657, 687 (2011) (identifying “positive political feedback” in instances in which “[s]tructures and
processes of political decisionmaking, as well as particular policy outcomes, often reshape politics in ways that
increase support for the institutions themselves”).
230
NORTH, supra note 220, at 95.
231
Id.
232
Moreover, the sheer complexity of the institutional system, with different rules, exceptions, and standards
developing to the betterment of one or another interest group, will grow over time, further increasing systemic
stability.
233
Young, supra note 21, at 456 (answering this question in the affirmative).

36

plausibly understood as having been enabled by textual rigidity. In both cases, I am willing to
concede that there is a nonfrivolous argument that the institutional novation might be viewed as
one that demanded a formal amendment, which in practice was unavailable due to Article V. At
the same time, that same provision of the Constitution stabilized expectations in a way that made
possible the practical investments that allowed parties and banks to develop as plausible
subconstitutional adaptions, rather than additions to the 1787 text.
a.

National political parties

Consider first the evolution of the early Republic’s national political party system. This
system was tailored to the 1787 constitutional dispensation. It also yielded increasing stabilityrelated returns up through the late 1810s. To be sure, the party system underwent transformation
after the war of 1812, and then collapsed in the late 1850s, opening the road to secession and the
Civil War.234 For my limited purposes, it suffices to show that the first party system was the kind
of stabilizing cooperative investment enabled by constitutional rigidity, and that it promoted
stability in the first two high-risk decades of the early Republic.
The architects of the 1787 Constitution famously “did not believe in political parties as
such” and instead “had a keen terror of party spirit and its evil consequences.”235 Early federal
candidates believed it dishonorable to campaign actively for office, and so turnout in federal
elections tended to be small.236 Yet by September 1792, James Madison could write that national
political parties were “natural”237 and by the second Congress “most officeholders could be
identified as Federalists or (Jeffersonian) Republicans.”238 While these new political formations
did not entirely resemble today’s political parties239 and kept their distance from the more
grassroots Democratic-Republic societies of the day,240 they still were characterized by “a
comprehensive and common ideology.”241
This two-party system was tightly fitted to the specifics of the 1787 constitutional
framework in etiology and form. At its origin, the party system was “largely a[n] alliance
between … elites” in the Philadelphia Convention.242 Recent empirical analysis of voting
234
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patterns in the Philadelphia Convention demonstrates that by its close “the interest constellations
within the Convention” as revealed in patterns in voting coalitions “were similar to those in the
newly settled political field” so that “state [delegate] alignments forecas[t] the contours of the
future party system.”243 Analysis of voting patterns in the 1789 Congress also reveal that early,
pre-party votes were “shifting” and “chaotic” as a consequence of cycling-based instability.244 It
may thus be that the push toward a duopolistic party system was deepened by the need to
mitigate cycling problems in the federal Congress,245 making the national party system a de facto
adaption to the Constitution’s choice of democratic mechanisms.
The first party system also had the effect of promoting political stability in the perilous
first years of the Republic. Parties did not merely articulate popular concerns, they also “helped
simultaneously to channel that discontent back into the system.”246 “When disgruntled citizens
began murmuring about secession and civil war, party leaders were able to encourage them to
turn to the polls…”247 During the sectional fracas over the Alien and Sedition Acts, for example,
leaders of the new national parties in state legislatures ensured that the alarums of the Virginia
and Kentucky resolutions produced no more amplitudinous destabilizing echo.248 Even in the
throes of the partisan crisis of the 1800 election, the party structures dampened proclivities to
exit the constitutional order. Hence, Federalist letters and memoirs of the late 1790s evince “a
basic predisposition … to accept a defeat, fairly administered, even in 1800 before that defeat
was a certainty.”249 That is, it was the Federalist network that disseminated the view that
electoral defeat was not an occasion for defection from the Constitution. At the same time,
parties served as the vehicles for expressing “sectional interests” in a way that did not result in
terminal instability.250 Political parties, in short, locked in powerful interest groups through
investments in assets specific to the 1787 Constitution, assets that, over time, delivered political
stability at an otherwise perilous moment.251
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b.

The Bank of the United States

At first blush, the Bank of the United States seems an unpromising candidate for positive
feedback effects. Established first in 1791 despite a chorus of constitutional criticisms, the
Bank’s charter expired twenty years later and was not immediately renewed. The Second Bank,
chartered in 1816, then saw renewal legislation vetoed by President Jackson in 1832. 252 But both
the 1816 and the 1836 dissolutions of the bank triggered runs on state banks, suspensions of their
operation, and national financial crises.253 Rather than suggesting superfluity, such consequences
of dissolution point to the Bank’s pivotal role in the new nation’s “modern financial system,”254 a
system that enabled “history’s most successful emerging market, attracting the capital or
investors in older nations seeking higher returns.”255 The Bank, like national political parties,
was thus a post-ratification institutional novation, created within the new constitutional
framework—and one that proved essential to the new dispensation’s survival. By fostering a
robust internal economy, even as frictions with foreign powers limited the growth of external
trade,256 the Bank in effect locked in states and important interest groups into a growing
American economy—and therefore the American Constitution—that could survive financial
contractions in 1812 and 1836.
At the time of Bank’s creation in 1791, only five other banks existed in the United
States.257 The new Bank, Hamilton predicted, would increase the money supply through its
emission of noninflationary paper currency, lower the cost of government borrowing, and
facilitate the payment and collection of taxes.258 By assuming the debt of the several states, it and
then assuting bondholders of a reliable interest stream, the Bank would “liberate the country’s
commercial energy by yoking high finance to national projects.”259 Yet Hamilton failed to
predict perhaps its most important policy consequence: On account of being the largest
transactor in the money market, the main government fiscal depository, and a general creditor of
other banks, the Bank “automatically exercised a general restraint upon the banking system” and
effectively established “central bank control of credit.”260 As well as a competitor to local banks,
the Bank acted as their “constant regulator” by dint of its collection of balances due from local
banks.261 The bank’s dissolution in 1812 only revealed the Treasury’s “need” for a central bank
“not merely to lend it money but to marshal the banking system” and to maintain a credible
252
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currency.262 In addition to generating new interstate frictions as banks declined to lend across
state lines,263 in the teeth of looming British invasion, dissolution proved near “disastrous for the
war effort.”264
The Bank fits both prerequisites for a subconstitutional institution with lock-in effects.
First, it was a costly innovation tightly configured to the specifics of the new Constitution, one
that required expenditure of much political capital to secure passage.265 A more flexible
constitutional amendment regime, which would have enabled less costly modifications of the
bank’s structure and simpler defaults on creditors, may have impeded the expenditure of that
political capital. The Bank also yielded a welfare surplus by providing a fiscal infrastructure for
the federal government.266 And, despite some opposition from state banks, its central bank
function enabled the growth of state banking.267
Second, the Bank, despite dissolutions in 1811 and 1836, had lock-in effects. Most
obviously, the Bank’s initial subscriptions induced fiscal investments by key members of the
political class.268 This had the direct effect of giving a large number of key political actors a
(literal) stake in the federal government’s success.269 More subtly, the Bank grew the supply of
national credit,270 and thereby fostered an internal market that entangled together interests across
the several states.271 Without the expansion of credit enabled by the First Bank, it is at least
arguable that American “society could never have commercialized as rapidly as it did.” 272 To be
sure, not every decision by the Bank was correct.273 Yet on balance, it seems fair to label the
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Bank as a rigidity-enabled instrument of entanglement—and hence stabilization—in the early
Republic.
C.

Anchoring a Constitution in Cooperative Institutions

This Part has identified two causal pathways mechanisms by which textual rigidity
promotes a constitution’s survival—by mitigating hold-ups and by inducing virtuous circles of
investment and confidence-accretion. Notwithstanding the Framers’ inchoate understanding of
amendment dynamics, there is some evidence that Article V had both effects in the key period of
the early Republic. These mechanisms diverge from dominant accounts of constitutional survival
canvassed in Part I.B, which are more focused on a need for “enforcers” drawn from “the
opposition” or “the citizenry.”274 On the latter view, the central problem of constitutional rule is
defection, and constitutions persist when they succeed in lowering the cost to enforcers of
detecting, preventing, and correcting defections by others. 275 This view focuses attention on the
question of how to minimize the costs of enforcement.276 It also leads to a concern for how
constitutional text can serve as a “focal point” to “narrow the range of disagreements” thereby
lowering the costs of coordinating opposition to constitutional breaches.277
By contrast, the mechanisms presented in this Part turn on the inducements that a
constitution creates for parties to comply, even absent third-party enforcement. This is consistent
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with private contracting dynamics, where deals abound even absent enforcement as a result of
“the dynamics of interactions” generating “mutually built assets of value to either party.”278
III.

Revisiting the Puzzles of Article V

This Part reconsiders the positive and normative puzzles identified in Part I in light of
Part II’s proposed causal link between textual rigidity and constitutional survival. To begin with,
I return to the question of why the U.S. Constitution’s survival seems so anomalous in
comparison to other nations’ experiences. The first section of this Part thus reconsiders the
question why rigid constitutions are so rare in a global perspective. Next, I focus on the
normative critiques of Article V. Accounting for the function of textual rigidity, I suggest, casts
these critiques in a fresh light. Finally, I press further on the normative implications of the
analysis by suggesting that they also illuminate ongoing debates about legitimacy of both judicial
review in general and also specific methods of constitutional intepretation.
A.

The Infrequency of Rigid Constitutions

If my arguments in Part II respecting the U.S. Constitution have any purchase, they ought
to provoke a new puzzlement: If rigidity does indeed conduce to constitutional survival in the
manner suggested by Part II, why does comparative epidemiological analysis of constitutional
survival suggest that it so often fails?279 That is, why is the United States an outlier? There are
two reasons for the dearth of observable successful rigid constitutions beyond U.S. borders. They
explain respectively why rigidity will not always be an appropriate design choice and, even when
it is warranted, why rigidity still often fails. In tandem, I contend, these reasons account for the
infrequency of textual rigidity in durable constitutions.
To begin with, it is worth illustrating the rarity of the U.S. Constitution. Figure I plots
data for 169 constitutions derived from the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) database.280
The y-axis shows the duration of the constitution. (The publicly available part of the database
does not specify duration data for surviving constitutions; hence the U.S. Constitution does not
appear). The x-axis records the rate of amendment as calculated by the CCP. Data for the 169
least amended documents (up to and including the U.S. Constitution) is presented.281 The
resulting scatter plot can be understood as snapshot estimating how likely infrequently amended
constitutions are to survive.
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Figure 1: Duration in Years of Rigid Constitutions (n=169)

This data suggests that, at least within the pool of rigid constitutions, the odds of endurance are
typically low. Only two constitutions in the sample proved relatively durable: the Bhutanese
Constitution of 1953 (52 years) and the El Salvadorian Constitution of 1886 (53 years).
Lifespans akin to that of the U.S. Constitution are relatively rare. No other clear secular trend
emerges, however, from the data. This suggesting that much more granular analysis using local
information about specific nations’ political and institutional circumstances would be needed to
identify causal forces at work. The CCP database does not contain that data.
The analysis of Part II, nevertheless, points towards two reasons why rigid constitutions
seem to rarely persist in the fashion of the U.S. Constitution. The first reason for rigidity’s
infrequency was intimated at the opening of Part II: Textual rigidity is a response to one specific
contracting problem of hold-up. It is not a general solution to the problems of constitutional
survival. But, as discussed, not all constitutional drafters need to be concerned about hold-up.
They need not be concerned, for example, if robust national institutions already exist. Hence,
constitutional makers in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall would not have needed
to attend to my argument because they already possessed many necessary state institutions, even
aside from the potential for fiscal and epistemic aid from western European counterparts.282 And
they should focus away from hold-up concerns if there is no set of robust political competitors
who might readily unsettle the constitutional order.283 Only when neither robust institutions nor
oligopolistic political competition is present does textual rigidity have potential utility. Hence, if
there are no large set of cases in which both these factors are indeed absent—as the data in
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Figure 1 suggests—constitution makers would be wise to view textual flexibility with
skepticism.
The second reason for rigidity’s rarity is that textual inflexibility is a risky strategy for
producing constitutional stability. Close attention to the mechanisms identified in Part II suggests
the success of a rigid constitution will turn disproportionately on decisions made by the first
post-enactment generations of interest-groups and factions. Interest groups in that period have
two potential strategies in response to a rigid constitution. First, they can make cooperative
investments, which will have increasing welfare returns and will over time embed interest groups
into a specific constitutional framework.284 Second, because rigidity merely mitigates the risk of
hold-up, and does not eliminate it entirely, risk-averse interest groups confronting a new
constitution may also decline entirely to invest. The sharply dichotomous character of this
election implies that small changes in behavior and judgment in the early days after a
constitution’s ratification will have large effects on the chances of a constitution’s survival.
Because they are highly sensitive to small, early-stage decisions, rigidity-based mechanisms of
constitutional survival are likely to have ex ante a “knife-edged” quality: “Everything hinges on
a single threshold determination”—to invest or not to invest?—with large, irreversible
downstream consequences.285 The chances of success may be finely balanced, with small
changes cascading into large differences in long-term pay-offs. When a pool of rigid
constitutions is observed ex post, it is likely that some cases fall on either side of the knife’s
edge, such that the pool will contain failures as well as successes.
This knife-edge quality of rigidity-based mechanisms is intertwined with path-dependent
nature of early constitutional development. In path dependent processes, “large consequences
may result from relatively ‘small’ or contingent events [and] particular courses of action, once
introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse” as a result of feedback mechanisms that
entrench certain features of the status quo.286 In constitutional development under a rigid
amendment rule, “[m]any paths are possible at the early stages,” with the choice turning on
seemingly small decisions; but after those decisions are made, “the path will be ‘locked in.’”287
How those early decisions will turn out in any given case is hard to predict. The decision to
invest or not under a new constitution will depend on what in effect are “random” effects,288 such
as the personalities of relevant political agents, accidents of historical circumstances, and other
factors outside the constitutional designers capacity to predict, let alone control. Sometimes, as
with the Articles of Confederation, those factors will not converge to produce constitutional
endurance. This large sensitivity to randomly distributed exogenous stresses—the “importance of

Cf. PIERSON, supra note 218, at 21 (noting that a core feature of path dependent systems is that “each step in a
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contingency”289—gives the appearance that a constitution’s fate rests on a knife’s edge in its
early stages.290 Ex ante, survival is hard to predict or guarantee; ex post, the pattern of failures
and successes can seem arbitrary.291
The knife-edge quality of path dependent processes may be compounded in the case of
rigidity-induced constitutional stability by a further dynamic. In most cases, the post-enactment
game is not binary. Cooperatively-produced public goods, such as new political or economic
institutions, may require the participation of many. These institutions, as a result, may be “step
goods” that “will be produced only if enough members … of the group contribute.”292 Given the
“strongly complementary” nature of contributions to step goods,293 potential contributors may
not come forward unless they know or expect that most, if not all, other potential contributors
will participate. In the context of the 1787 Constitution, for example, each state wanted to join
the new constitution provided a sufficient number of others joined.294 At the same time, perfect
contribution was not needed: Hence, the decisions of North Carolina and Rhode Island not to
ratify at first did not undermine the Constitution’s September 1788 activation.295 In cases of
common contributions to step goods, the presence or absence of common expectations may make
the difference between success and failure.296 Common beliefs that others will contribute
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conduce to a constitution’s success, while a momentary and transient failure of political culture
might undermine the whole constitutional project.
For all these reasons, constitutional design founded on textual rigidity is not for the faint
of heart, even if circumstances otherwise conduce to the employment of rigidity. A rigid
constitution’s survival partly depends on contingent events beyond a designer’s control. After the
fact, what may seem manifest destiny may better be understood as a species of luck.297
B.

Revisiting and Revising the Normative Critiques of Article V

The analysis to this point has offered a response to the positive puzzle of Article V. But
recognizing a causal link between textual rigidity and constitutional survival may also cast light
on the normative critiques of Article V showcased in Part I.C. Recall that the most forceful of
these focus on Article V’s countermajoritarian and “dead hand” consequences. Condemnation of
Article V on countermajoritarian grounds, though, takes on a paradoxical cast once the survivalrelated benefits of rigidity are recognized. One can, after all, complain about the dead hand’s
lingering grip only if one’s constitution has in fact survived long past its birth. Dead constitutions
have no withering hold on democratic choice. In effect, critics who tender the countermajoritian
charge assume a baseline of constitutional survival to launch an attack on the very mechanism
that produced such survival. The more appropriate comparison juxtaposes a world after a
constitution’s death with life under the rigid constitution. Criticism of Article V as
countermajoritarian, in other words, is at best debatable and at worst rests on a flawed (if
implicit) normative baseline.
Yet the analysis developed in this Article also hints at a way of reworking the
countermajoritarian critique of Article V. Rather than making an absolute claim about the
deleterious consequences of textual rigidity, critics of Article V’s vice-like grip might instead
focus on the possibility that an optimal constitutional amendment rule is not time invariant. As
the empirical work of Ginsburg, Elkins, and Melton demonstrates, the risk of constitutional death
looms largest in the first two decades of a constitution’s life cycle, and thereafter drops off
considerably.298 This finding suggests the value of a design mechanism to dampen the risk of
failure will be great in those first two decades. I have argued that, at least in the American
context, it is plausible to contend that early-stage mortality risk was mitigated in important part
by the textual rigidity fostered by Article V.
Notice though that I have been careful to specify that this justification only applies to an
early period in the Constitution’s history. And I have further been careful not to claim that
merely because a constitution survives its perilous adolescence its survival is assured. Rather, as
constitutions age they are threatened by a different risk. In early periods, perhaps the most
important risk is that parties will make insufficient investments in the new constitutional order or
will even defect. As Part II argued, rigidity provides one solution to these risks. But in later
periods, the risk of defection or a failure of national institutions for want of buy-in will likely
Cf. JERVIS, supra note 286, at 156 (“Looking back at a pattern, we may overestimate the degree of determinism
involved.”).
298
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have diminished as parties become more entangled in a constitution-specific ecosystem of
national institutions. In those later periods, perhaps the most important threat to constitutional
survival is likely to emerge from the failure to adapt to changing social, economic, and
geostrategic circumstances, or to respond to exogenous shocks such as economic crises, military
confrontations, or natural disasters. Further, claims by constituencies originally excluded from
the constitutional bargain may become more pressing—the cases of African-Americans and
women are obvious examples from the American context—and hence more destabilizing with
time.299 All else being equal, the case for adaption in the face of this second variety of risk grows
over time. Political status quos at the time of ratification are unlikely to persist. The probability
of salient exogenous shocks compounds over time. A constitution that cannot adapt to
industrialization, geostrategic shocks, or new kinds of security threats is not a constitution that
will long persist. Just as the risk of hold-ups and suboptimal investments diminishes, so the cost
of constitutional inflexibility rises. Rather than insufficient rigidity, the problem then becomes
one of too much inflexibility.
This analysis has consequences for the optimal level of constitutional rigidity. It suggests
an optimal constitutional amendment rule (at least in the American constitutional order) may
well not be static but may instead be temporally sensitive. The constitution should be
characterized by high barriers to change in the early decades of a nation, followed by a sharp
decline in those barriers as exogenous pressures on the nation-state accumulate. Accordingly, the
Framers can be faulted not for being countermajoritarian, but for not including a two-speed
amendatory process in their Constitution: rigid like Article V for the first few decades to absorb
the shocks of adolescence, but then switching to the malleable thereafter so as to adapt to new
exogenous strains and shocks of a nation’s maturity. Note that it is no response to say that multispeed amendment rules are hard to draft. Article V already imposes differentially higher barriers
to textual amendments that concern either the slave trade or certain elements of state
sovereignty.300 So the Framers had on hand drafting solutions. They just did not use them.
The problem with Article V, then, is not that it yields too rigid a constitutional text. The
problem is rather that it has yielded too rigid a constitution for too long. What worked in the
early Republic to address the peril of hold-up became increasingly dysfunctional in the fluid
economic and geopolitical contexts of the late nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries.
Nevertheless, it may be that Americans did create a multi-speed amendatory process that
addressed the risk of hold-up in the Constitution’s early days, but also addressed the risk of
failing to adapt to exogenous shocks in later periods. Americans did this, I suggest, by slowly
developing extratextual tools for amendment of the Constitution through statutes or via judicial
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decisions. These tools came to be to address the risk of non-adaption in later periods after textual
rigidity had ceased to be of large value. From this perspective, it is possible to posit two discrete
periods in American constitutional development: the first dominated by durability, and the
second characterized by fluidity and change. Alternatively, the urge toward rigid periodization
might be resisted in favor of a more nuanced vision of a constitution subject to a gradually
changing amendment rate—i.e., one that evolved solely with the emergence of new extratextual
methods of interpretation such as judicial review, super-statutes, and constitutional moments.
Whether one adopts the position that our Constitution had a two-speech history, or cast
constitutional rigidity as a continuous variable subject to incremental change, the central point I
wish to emphasize here is the sheer fact of change over time in the de facto amendment role, and,
consequently, the rate of institutional development.
Viewing American constitutional history in this light yields some reason to cease fretting
so much about the legitimacy of judicial review as a channel of constitutional change. 301 The
Framers may not have perceived the wisdom of a multi-speed amendatory process that
distinguished between different moments in the post-ratification period. But successive
generations of federal politicians and voters have intuited the value of ratcheting up the quantum
of fluidity in their constitutional order as the principal threat to that order evolved. Over time,
they have invented, and come to accept as legitimate, an increasing range of mechanisms for
extra-textual constitutional change, ranging from bisectional compromises to landmark statutes
to judicial review. All are means to adapt the 1787 settlement to new stresses, new challenges,
and new realities.302 All are also products of subconstitutional institutions—e.g., the network of
federal courts and a legislature operating in a robust national public sphere—that were rendered
feasible by Article V-induced rigidity. The increasing plurality and inventiveness observed in
any comprehensive study of the mechanisms of American constitutional change, that is,
demonstrates that Article V enabled the creation of instruments of constitutional change that
could supersede the text’s monopoly on constitutional change. That increasing heterogeneity of
amendment mechanisms, moreover, illuminates the wisdom of Americans over time, who,
having secured the benefits of Article V-induced rigidity, then felt a need for more fluidity in the
constitutional order and found ways to bring it about notwithstanding the barriers imposed by
Article V itself.
The potentially dire counterfactual to this story of institutional evolution merits emphasis.
Had politicians and citizens not grasped the value of extra-textual mechanisms for inducing
constitutional change, the risk of constitutional death due to the failure to adapt to evolving
circumstances would likely have destabilized the Constitution. Industrialization, globalization of
trade, growing military conflict, and endogenous social change all imposed unanticipated strains
on the constitutional order. Hewing literal-mindedly to the putative originalist rules, say, for
congressional power and executive discretion would likely have invited national calamity and
constitutional failure. Just as the naked claim that Article V is countermajoritarian fails to
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account for the appropriate baseline comparator, so broad condemnations of post-ratification,
extra-textual technologies of constitutional change are also implausible in the absence of a
plausible benchmark. Rather than comparing the present state of affairs against a utopian vision
without those extra-textual modalities of constitutional change, critics should contrast the
observed status quo to a world in which the Constitution has failed due to exogenous economic,
military, or geopolitical strains.
On this view, the incremental discovery and adoption of extra-textual complements to
Article V should be celebrated and not regretted. In the early Republic, Article V provided a
robust means to respond to contested judicial decision such as Chisolm v. Georgia303 and to fix a
defective presidential selection mechanism.304 In that era, textual rigidity was the more valuable
default rule. As the Republic matured, the pressure for fundamental change compounded from
year by year.305 At some point, the need for constitutional change outran the ability of national
political institutions to provide it through Article V procedures. Had the Court (abetted by the
White House and Congress) not increasingly assumed an assertive role in constitutional affairs
after a century of relative quiescence,306 it is possible that external pressures would have inflicted
considerable damage, eventually even a fatal blow, to the Constitution. In that light, the
emergence of increasingly robust judicial review simply responded to the increasing need for
extra-textual vehicles of constitutional change without which the Constitution may well not have
survived.307 Similarly, Congress’s ability and willingness to fashion statutory schemes that
refashioned fundamental elements of the constitutional order can be seen as a necessary form of
innovation given the fact of Article V’s sheer obduracy. Even if not all ensuing changes to the
constitutional order were welfare-enhancing, it is quite plausible to think that in net these
mechanisms were beneficial. Viewed from this perspective, the overwriting of the 1787
constitution with novel and extra-textual mechanisms for constitutional change through the
federal courts seems less a problem and more a solution to the more important design flaw in the
text of Article V—it’s failure to specify a generally applicable dual-speed amendment regime.308
In short, ours is (at least) a two-speed Constitution. Its shifting amendatory regime, while
not embodied in text, may have provided solutions to quite different threats to constitutional
survival (i.e., the hold-up problem and the failure-to-adapt problem) in the different periods in
which those threats obtained. Rather than illicit substitutes for Article V, now common
mechanisms of extra-textual constitutional change are better understood as Article V’s
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complements—and its legacies. What some have construed as constitutional infidelity,309 in
other words, in fact has been part of our Constitution’s saving grace.310
C.

Rethinking “Historical Gloss”

Just as the analysis presented in this Article might provoke rethinking of the merits of
judicial review in the abstract, it also might promote a reconsideration of some of the retail tools
employed within constitutional interpretation. I develop in this final section a suggestive
example. It involves the link between textual rigidity and constitutional survival in relation to the
interpretative deployment of what Justice Frankfurter called “systemic, unbroken executive
practice … as a gloss” on the Constitution.311 Following Justice Frankfurter’s lead, the Court
tends to rely on historical practice especially in foreign affairs and separation of powers cases.312
Despite the Court’s long usage of historical practice as a gloss on constitutional text, concerns
linger about whether interbranch acquiescence, long assumed to be a touchstone for reliance
upon historical practice, indeed supplies the appropriate guide of what evidence is salient to
constitutional interpretation.313
Judicial employment of historical gloss raises a host of important and interesting
issues. This Article’s analysis of Article V simply suggests one dimension along which the
salience of historical practice might be assessed, a dimension that to date has received little
attention. Specifically, it suggests that historical practice ought to matter if it emerged in the first
314
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few decades of constitutional history, but perhaps less so otherwise. Institutions and practices
established in the immediate wake of ratification played a role in stabilizing the Constitution
through the virtuous-circle mechanism. Hence, they are plausibly viewed as but-for causes of the
Constitution’s longevity, entitled to positive presumptions of constitutional validity.
Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court has viewed both parties and the central
bank as constitutionally authorized. This not only means, for example, that outr two national
political parties are not condemned in the jurisprudence as a species of refractory faction that
Madison would have condemned. It also entails that the Supreme Court has suggested that
electoral regulations limiting third-party competition at the polls are valid in light of the state’s
legitimate interest in protecting the two-party system.315 The consequences of state limitations on
the associational rights of third parties with an eye to protecting incumbent parties for democratic
contestation have prompted much criticism of that doctrine.316 The Court’s solicitude for
bipartisan competition, however, may be recast as defending its contribution during the early
Republic to the stabilization of the new constitutional order.
Along similar lines, it can be argued that Chief Justice Marshall was justified in
sustaining the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States in M’Culloch v. Maryland
despite considerable popular resistance by saying that “all branches of the government have …
been acting on the existence of this power, nearly thirty years, it would seem almost too late to
call it in question, unless its repugnancy with the constitution were plain and manifest.” 317 The
Bank, as one of the pivotal anchors of the 1787 constitutional disposition, had earned its
legality.318 Indeed, even its early for Madison recognized as much by 1816.319 In contrast, this
theory of path dependent institutional development provides no support for the legtimating
invocation of historical practices that emerged long after the early Republican period. Hence, the
Court’s reluctant to attribute significance to post-New Deal congressional use of the legislative
veto in a case invalidating such devices may have a justification beyond the reasons offered by
the Court.320
The link between textual rigidity and constitutional survival thus points toward a
temporally sensitive account of how historical practice should be employed in constitutional
315

See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 353-54, 367 (1997) (upholding restrictions on
“fusion” candidates, and noting that states can enact election regulations that “in practice, favor the traditional twoparty system”); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-96 (1986) (upholding primary qualification
requirements for third party candidates to appear on the general election ballot); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 72930, 736 (1974) (upholding restrictions on independent candidates for office, and affirming that states can take
measures to prevent “unrestrained factionalism”).
316
For criticisms in the wake of Timmons, see Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court
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REV. 331 (1997).
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M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 323 (1819).
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See David A. Strauss, Not Unwritten, After All?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1538 (2013) (discussing the way in
which the first Bank garnered legitimacy through early practice).
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interpretation. That approach would be consistent not only with extant case law, but also in
harmony with James Madison’s assertion in the Federalist Papers that constitutional meaning
would be “liquidated and ascertained” through the initial practice of federal politicians in the
early Republic.321 Those early years of the Republic were indeed pivotal—but not for reasons
that Madison predicted or perceived.
Conclusion
Article V has long occasioned embarrassment and evasion. But the textual rigidity it
fostered should be celebrated as having been pivotal to the Constitution’s survival during the
parlous, storm-tossed days of the early Republic. Without the benefit of a sophisticated
understanding of transaction-cost economics, the Framers chanced on an effective solution to the
problem of constitutional hold-ups, which likely deepened the prospect of constitutional survival
through the tempestuous first decades of the Constitution’s life. Sometimes, it appears, being
lucky is as valuable as being wise.
This Article has focused on explaining and defending textual rigidity’s function in the
early Republic. But the fact of the Constitution’s survival through to the present day is testimony
not merely to the virtues of textual rigidity—which responded solely to early-stage threats to
constitution survival—but also to later institutional innovations by politicians and judges in
conjuring extra-textual complements to Article V. These facilitated adjustment to exogenous
shocks and evolving social, economic and political circumstances. The interaction between
Article V and these extra-textual modalities of constitutional change, I have suggested, is more
complex than the stark, binary incompatibility between constitutional fidelity and judicial license
that is often posited. Rather than competitors, Article V and its extra-textual analogs are partial
complements. As much as it calls for reconsideration of Article V, in sum, this Article invites a
rethinking of the subtle and ever-shifting relationship between the diverse textual, judicial, and
political modes of constitutional change invented across the decades and centuries by our
fortunate, ingenuous, and oddly long-lived nation.
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